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CORPORATE MISCONDUCT AND THE PERFECT 
STORM OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
Jessica Erickson* 
When it comes to combating corporate misconduct, is more litigation nec-
essarily better? The conventional wisdom is that we should deploy every 
weapon in the law's arsenal to combat corporate misconduct. This wisdom, 
however, reflects legal scholarship that is confined to analyzing securities class 
actions and derivative suits in isolation, with little inquiry into the interplay 
between them. By Jailing to take a broader view of shareholder litigation, legal 
scholars have missed an opportunity to provide courts with the conceptual tools 
necessary to meet the complex challenges of complex corporate litigation. In 
courtrooms and boardrooms across the country, a debate is raging over whether 
courts should permit shareholders to file parallel securities class actions and 
derivative suits arising out of the same allegations of corporate wrongdoing-a 
debate that has gone almost entirely unnoticed in the legal academy. The time 
has come for legal theory to catch up with legal practice. We must re-concep-
tualize the tools we use to combat corporate misconduct, recognizing that securi-
ties class actions and derivative suits can work together to achieve the diverse 
goal5 of shareholder litigation. We should then bring these new conceptual 
insights to bear on the current legal debate over how courts should handle par-
allel securities class actions and derivative suits. Now is the perfect time to 
calm the peifect storm of shareholder litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of corporate misconduct, corporations are often 
caught in a perfect storm of shareholder litigation. 1 In securities class 
actions, corporations are the defendants, and their goal is to fend off 
allegations of corporate wrongdoing. In derivative suits, these same 
corporations (acting through representative shareholders) are the 
plaintiffs, and their goal is often to prove the very allegations that the 
corporations are denying in the securities class actions. These lawsuits 
thus place corporations on both sides of a single legal battle, creating 
a risk that a corporation will prevail in a derivative suit only to find its 
victory used against it in a securities class action. Given the recent 
wave of massive corporate scandals, perhaps the corporation's predic-
ament should not trouble us. Indeed, the flood of litigation may reas-
sure us that similar corporate scandals are less likely to occur in the 
I Like Sebastian Junger, I use the term "perfect storm" in a meteorological 
sense, in the sense of "a storm that could not possibly have been worse." SEBASTIAN 
juNGER, THE PERFECT STORM xiv (1997). The use of this term is not meant to imply 
that corporations are blameless or that they find themselves in this predicament 
through mere chance. Cf Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, 
in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 927, 929-930 (Nancy B. Rapo-
port & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (arguing that Enron was brought down by a "syner-
gistic combination of human errors and hubris: a 'Titanic' miscalculation, rather than 
a 'perfect storm'"). 
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future. Yet a troubling question remains. When it comes to combat-
ing corporate misconduct, is more litigation necessarily better? 
The conventional wisdom is that we should deploy every weapon 
in the law's arsenal to combat corporate misconduct.2 Securities 
class actions and derivative suits are the primary weapons in this arse-
nal because they are the means by which shareholders enforce the 
legal duties of corporations and their managers.3 Eager to prevent 
the next Enron, legal scholars have devoted considerable attention to 
these lawsuits, but their scholarship has been almost entirely confined 
to analyzing securities class actions and derivative suits in isolation, 
without examining the interplay between them.4 In an era when 
corporations accused of misconduct are besieged by litigation,5 this 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 I am speaking here purely about the legal means to enforce fiduciary duties. 
The market obviously plays a powerful role in policing corporate managers as well. 
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1416, 1418-22 (1989). In cases involving mergers or acquisitions, sharehold-
ers may also be able to enforce the fiduciary duties of corporate managers through 
direct suits (usually shareholder class actions) filed under state law. See, e.g., Robert B. 
Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-
Oriented Class Actions, 57 V AND. L. REv. 133, 181 (2004) (analyzing the rise of acquisi-
tion-oriented shareholder class actions). Outside of the acquisition context and cer-
tain other narrow contexts, however, shareholders are generally limited to filing a 
derivative suit or a federal securities class action to enforce the legal duties of 
managers. 
4 See, e.g., Stephen]. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VANo. L. 
REv. 1465, 1468-76, 1507-22 (2004) (exploring the impact of changes in federal law 
on securities class actions and the possibility of exporting the securities class action 
model to other countries); James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 
BROOK. L. REv. 3, 5-19 (1999) (analyzing the deterrent and compensatory goals of 
derivative suits); Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Inter-
ests?, 82 GEO. LJ. 1733, 1758-61 (1994) (analyzing the conflicts of interest inherent in 
securities class actions); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and 
Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 V AND. L. REv. 174 7, 1762 (2004) (exploring the 
role of derivative suits in modern corporate litigation); Elliott]. Weiss &John S. Beck-
erman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency 
Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE LJ. 2053, 2105-09 (1995) (arguing that insti-
tutional investors should play a greater role in monitoring the settlements of securi-
ties class actions). 
5 For example, when the massive fraud at Enron Corporation was revealed, the 
company was named in nearly one hundred securities class actions and fifty derivative 
suits. See Disclosure Statement for Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors 
Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, at app. E, In re Enron 
Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2004), available at http:/ /www.elaw4 
enron.com/EnronPlanframe.htm; Joann S. Lublin & John R. Emshwiller, Enron 
Board's Actions Raise Liability Questions, WALL ST.j.,Jan. 17, 2002, at Cl. 
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traditional approach no longer makes sense, if indeed it ever 
did. 6 
Now more than ever, legal scholars must rethink the way in which 
they view shareholder litigation. In boardrooms and courtrooms 
across the country, a debate is raging over whether shareholders 
should be permitted to file derivative suits based on the same allega-
tions as parallel securities class actions. 7 This debate raises fundamen-
tal questions about the ambitions of shareholder litigation and its role 
in combating corporate misconduct. Scholars have long recognized 
that shareholder litigation is intended to deter future instances of cor-
porate misconduct and punish the individuals involved in corporate 
scandals.8 Yet shareholder litigation-like all private litigation-is 
also intended to compensate the plaintiffs in these lawsuits, including 
corporate plaintiffs in derivative suits.9 These compensatory goals 
should not fall by the wayside when a securities class action is added to 
the mix. After all, a corporation has little to gain by winning $5 mil-
lion in a derivative suit if the suit in turn causes the corporation to 
lose $50 million in a related securities class action. 
The time has come for legal theory to catch up with legal prac-
tice. First, we need to reconceptualize the way in which we view share-
holder litigation. The current doctrinal framework fails to recognize 
that securities class actions and derivative suits can work together to 
achieve the diverse goals of shareholder litigation. As a result, the 
current framework misses an opportunity to provide courts with the 
conceptual tools necessary to meet the complex challenges of com-
plex corporate litigation. Second, we must bring these new concep-
tual insights to bear on the current legal debate over how courts 
should handle parallel securities class actions and derivative suits. 
Once we understand that society's desire to deter corporate miscon-
duct need not rest solely on the shoulders of derivative suits, we can 
(and should) recognize that these suits have greater value in promot-
ing compensatory goals. In practice, this means that courts should 
6 A few scholars have discussed briefly the relationship between various types of 
shareholder litigation. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 
VAND. L. REv. 387, 412-15 (2008); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities 
Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 887-90 
(2003). No scholar, however, has ever performed an extensive analysis of this 
relationship. 
7 See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. 
9 See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784, 786 (Del. 1981) (hold-
ing that "[d]erivative suits enforce corporate rights" and that the law permits share-
holders to sue on behalf of corporations where "it is apparent that material corporate 
rights would not otherwise be protected"). 
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only permit shareholders to pursue derivative suits that are in the best 
interests of plaintiff corporations, taking into account all of the costs 
and benefits of the suit, including the impact of the suit on a parallel 
securities class action-an approach that many courts have steadfastly 
rejected. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the conflict 
between securities class actions and derivative suits. This Part chal-
lenges the conventional wisdom that securities class actions and deriv-
ative suits are a zero-sum game, or more specifically, that corporations 
can use derivative suits to offset their losses in securities class actions. 
Part II explores the current judicial response to this conflict, arguing 
that courts have been unable to resolve the conflict because they have 
failed to understand the proper goals of shareholder litigation. Part 
III presents a proposed solution to this conflict. This proposal recon-
ceptualizes the relationship between various types of shareholder liti-
gation, recognizing the value, and the limits, of different types of 
shareholder lawsuits. In the end, more litigation is not necessarily bet-
ter when it comes to combating corporate misconduct. 
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AND 
DERIVATIVE SUITS 
Legal scholars have ignored the relationship between securities 
class actions and derivative suits because they have accepted an unspo-
ken but powerful conventional wisdom. 10 According to this conven-
tional wisdom, derivative suits benefit corporations even when they 
10 This conventional wisdom is so well accepted in the legal literature that no 
scholars have questioned it or even addressed it explicitly, and yet it is the common 
response when the topic of the relationship between securities class actions and deriv-
ative suits is raised. We can see more subtle expressions of the conventional wisdom 
in a number of contexts. For example, courts often permit a single attorney to 
represent the named shareholders in both a derivative suit and a securities class 
action. Even though the attorney is representing the corporation in one suit and 
suing the corporation in the other suit, courts have held that these dual roles are 
permissible given that the goal of both suits is to "attack ... alleged misconduct by 
corporate management." In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 624, 630 
(S.D. Ohio 1984); see also Grace v. Rosenstock, No. CV-85-2039, 1986 WL 2709, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1986) ("The prevailing view is that class and derivative actions repre-
sented by the same plaintiff and counsel are not inherently precluded by conflicting 
party alignment." (quoting HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS§ 22.23 
(2d ed. 1977)). Courts have also permitted plaintiff shareholders to join securities 
claims and derivative claims in a single lawsuit. See, e.g., Keyser v. Commonwealth 
Nat'! Fin. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 489, 492 (M.D. Pa. 1988) Uoining a securities class action 
and a derivative suit because both lawsuits were "equally contingent upon the proof of 
the same nucleus of facts" (quoting In re Dayco Corp., 102 F.R.D. at 630)). 
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follow on the heels of parallel securities class actions because deriva-
tive suits allow corporations to recoup the losses that corporations 
incur in securities class actions. 11 This conventional wisdom, however, 
misses a key piece of the puzzle. While it recognizes the similarities 
between securities class actions and derivative suits-similar players, 
similar factual allegations, and similar legal standards-it ignores the 
key differences between these lawsuits, including the differences in 
the amount of recoverable damages and the differences in the inter-
ests of the parties filing the lawsuits. When one examines the full pic-
ture, similarities and differences, the conflict between securities class 
actions and derivative suits becomes clear. 
A. Surveying Similarities 
1. Similar Players 
To understand the conventional wisdom, as well as its flaws, one 
must first recognize that the players in securities class actions and 
derivative suits are often identical, although their roles are not. In a 
securities class action, the plaintiffs are shareholders alleging that a 
corporation and its individual officers and directors violated the fed-
eral securities laws by making false or misleading public statements. 12 
The defendants in a securities class action are the corporation and the 
corporation's current or former officers and directors. The corpora-
tion is directly liable for its own false or misleading statements and 
vicariously liable for the false or misleading statements of its officers 
and directors. 13 Any recovery in the lawsuit goes to the corporation's 
11 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An 
Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 581, 604 ("A ... zero-sum 
situation arises when class counsel brings both derivative and direct cases based on 
the same nucleus of operative fact."). 
12 Over 90% of securities class actions allege violations of section lO(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), which 
prohibits corporations or other persons from making false or misleading statements 
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Grif-
fith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Liability 
Insurance Market, 74 U. Cm. L. REv. 487, 498 (2007). 
13 See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 
365-66 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a corporation is directly liable for all false or 
misleading statements contained within "the SEC filings, reports and releases issued 
in its name" as long as the false or misleading statements were made with scienter); In 
re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("A corporate entity 
can be vicariously liable under section lO(b) for the fraud of its officers. So long as 
scienter is appropriately alleged for the officers and directors of a company, then it is 
appropriately alleged for the company itself." (citation omitted)). 
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shareholders. 14 I will refer to the corporation in its role as a defen-
dant in a securities class action as the "defendant corporation" and to 
the shareholders in these actions as "securities plaintiffs." 
The corporation's role in a derivative suit is reversed. In a deriva-
tive suit, the corporation is the functional plaintiff-the real party in 
interest15-and the allegations are that the corporation's current or 
former officers and directors breached their fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration.16 Any recovery in a derivative suit is returned to the corpo-
ration.17 As a result, shareholders may receive an indirect benefit 
from a derivative suit because of their share of ownership in the cor-
poration, but they do not receive any direct financial benefit. 
In a derivative suit, despite the fact that the suit is brought in its 
name, the corporation's role is limited because shareholders file these 
suits on behalf of corporations. The law gives shareholders this power 
because corporate officers and directors, who normally decide 
whether corporations should file lawsuits, are often implicated in the 
alleged wrongdoing and therefore cannot be trusted to make unbi-
ased decisions regarding the merits of these suits. 18 I will refer to the 
corporation in its role as the plaintiff in a derivative suit as the "plain-
tiff corporation" and to the shareholders who file derivative suits as 
the "derivative plaintiffs." 
The conflict between securities class actions and derivative suits 
results in large part from the fact that the same parties are showing up 
14 See Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that the "general rule" is that shareholders in a securities class action can "recover the 
difference between the value of the consideration paid and the value of the securities 
received, plus consequential damages that can be proven with reasonable certainty to 
have resulted from the fraud"). 
15 See Van Gelder v. Taylor, 621 F. Supp. 613, 620 (N.D. III. 1985) ("As a general 
rule, the plaintiff stockholder in a stockholder's derivative suit is 'at best the nominal 
plaintiff.' The corporation is the real party in interest, regardless of the fact that the 
corporate management has failed to pursue the action." (citation omitted) (quoting 
Liddy v. Urbanek, 707 F.2d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 1983))). 
16 See Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003) ("Derivative 
suits allow shareholders to bring suit against wrongdoers on behalf of the corpora-
tion, and force liable parties to compensate the corporation for injuries so caused."). 
17 See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) ("In [a deriva-
tive suit] the shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation . . . . [A]ny damages 
recovered ... are paid to the corporation." (quoting ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE 
L\w 639-40 (1986))). 
18 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The derivative action 
developed in equity to enable shareholders to sue in the corporation's name where 
those in control of the company refused to assert a claim belonging to it."). 
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in both courtrooms. 19 When a corporation is on the hook for losses 
resulting from individual defendants' conduct in a securities class 
action, it will understandably be reluctant to press claims against these 
same individuals in a derivative suit. This conflict is exacerbated by 
the fact that the arguments being made in these two lawsuits, from the 
factual allegations to their legal ramifications, are strikingly similar as 
well. 
2. Similar Factual Allegations 
The factual allegations in securities class actions and derivative 
suits provide a window into a corporation's darkest hours. These law-
suits are replete with allegations of sweeping financial impropriety 
and corporate duplicity. In securities class actions, shareholders typi-
cally allege that the corporation's public statements were false or mis-
leading as a result of the corporation's failure to disclose problems 
with its business model or financial results. 20 In a derivative suit, 
shareholders frequently allege that the corporation's officers or direc-
tors breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation by making the 
false or misleading public statements21 or by causing the problems in 
the first instance.22 Thus, shareholders can turn a single set of facts 
into the basis of both a securities class action and a derivative suit. 
19 It is true that there is often not a perfect overlap between the individual 
defendants in the two sets of suits. Securities class actions tend to involve claims 
against corporate officers, while derivative suits tend to involve claims against corpo-
rate directors. Cf Thompson & Sale, supra note 6, at 895-96 (presenting data illus-
trating that corporate officers are named in securities class actions more often than 
corporate directors). For the corporation, however, as long as the factual allegations 
against the individual defendants revolve around the same core set of events, the fact 
that the two lawsuits do not involve the exact same group of individual defendants 
does little to ameliorate the company's predicament. 
20 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASs ACTION CAsE FILINGS: 2007 Mm-
YEAR AssESSMENT 13 (2007), http://securities.comerstone.com/pdfs/2007%20Mid-
Year%20Assessment.pdf (finding that ninety-two percent of securities class actions 
allege misrepresentations in financial documents). 
21 See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) ("[D]irectors who knowingly 
disseminate false information that results in corporate injury or damage to an individ-
ual stockholder violate their fiduciary duty, and may be held accountable in a manner 
appropriate to the circumstances."). 
22 See, e.g., Rattner v. Bidzos, No. Civ.A. 19700, 2003 WL 22284323, at *l (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 30, 2003) (alleging that the individual defendants in a derivative suit "breached 
their fiduciary duty of care by inadequately maintaining accounting controls and 
utilizing improper accounting and audit practices"); Manzo v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 
Civ.A. 18451-NC, 2002 WL 31926606, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2002) (relating the 
plaintiff's allegations that a corporation's directors and officers were liable in a deriva-
tive suit under a breach of fiduciary duty theory for allegedly false and misleading 
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The litigation against Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. 
(MSL) illustrates this point. These claims arose out of the well-known 
obstruction of justice charges filed against Martha Stewart, the domes-
tic doyenne and former Chief Executive Officer and Chairperson of 
MSL. 23 Martha Stewart had significant personal holdings in a small 
biotechnology company called ImClone Systems, Inc.24 Stewart was 
also a personal friend of Sam Waksal, ImClone's then-CE0.25 On 
December 26, 2001, ImClone learned that the FDA had rejected its 
drug application for a cancer drug called Erbitux. 26 Over the next 
several days, Stewart had conversations with her broker regarding her 
ImClone stock and may also have spoken with Waksal directly. 27 On 
December 27, 2001, the day before ImClone announced the FDA's 
rejection of its drug application, Stewart sold all of her personal 
ImClone stock, then worth approximately $228,000.28 The timing of 
Stewart's stock sale raised the suspicion of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the United States Attorney for the South-
ern District of New York, both of which filed charges in connection 
with the sale.29 
In the summer and fall of 2002, MSL sought to protect Stewart by 
repeatedly denying that she had traded on the basis of inside informa-
tion. 30 As more information relating to the sale became public, how-
statements "in virtually every single piece of financial information released by Rite Aid 
for over three years"). 
23 In March 2004, Stewart was convicted of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and 
making false statements relating to her sale of ImClone stock. See Associated Press, 
Martha Stewart to Fight Civil Case, WALL ST. J., May 27-28, 2006, at B3. The SEC also 
filed civil charges of insider trading against Stewart. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm'n, Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic Settle SEC's Insider Trading Charges 
(Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-134.htm. 
24 See Consolidated and Amended Class Action Complaint ii 33, Semon v. Martha 
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 2003 WL 22769065 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2003) (No. 02-
CV-6273 UES)), 2002 WL 32495905 [hereinafter Securities Complaint]. The Consoli-
dated and Amended Class Action Complaint is the last version of the complaint filed 
in the securities class action. This action consolidated seven securities class actions 
previously filed in the Southern District of New York. See Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 12-13 (Mar. 15, 2004). 
25 See Securities Complaint, supra note 24, 11 33. 
26 See id. n 44-45. 
27 See id. n 49-53. 
28 See id. 11 53. 
29 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Martha Stewart, Broker 
Peter Bacanovic with Illegal Insider Trading Uune 4, 2003), avail,able at http://www. 
sec.gov I news/ press/2003-69.htm. 
30 See, e.g., Securities Complaint, supra note 24, 11 87 ("Martha Stewart did not 
receive any nonpublic information regarding ImClone prior to her sale of a small 
number of ImClone shares. Her transaction was entirely lawful." (quoting June 7, 
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ever, and MSL's shareholders began to fear civil and criminal 
repercussions against Stewart, the price of MSL's stock began to fall 
dramatically, from a high of $18.45 on June 3, 2002 to a low of $6.69 
on August 9, 2002.31 By the end of the summer, several MSL share-
holders had filed securities class actions alleging that the company 
made false and misleading statements when it denied that Stewart had 
received inside information.32 These class actions were quickly fol-
lowed by derivative suits based on the same facts. 33 The derivative 
suits alleged that Stewart, as well as other MSL officers and directors, 
violated their fiduciary duties to the corporation by failing to ensure 
that Stewart carried out her personal affairs in a way that did not jeop-
ardize the financial well-being of the corporation. 34 
A comparison of the complaints in the two sets of cases shows 
how easily the shareholder plaintiffs were able to use the same set of 
facts to support two different legal theories. Both complaints alleged 
that MSL depended heavily on Martha Stewart's image, citing the 
same paragraph of a MSL prospectus in which the company stated 
that " [ o] ur continued success and the value of our brand 
name ... depends, to a large degree, on the reputation of Martha 
Stewart. "35 Both complaints alleged that Stewart instructed her bro-
ker to sell her ImClone shares after her broker informed her that 
2002 statement by Susan Magrino, publicist for Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, 
Inc.)); id.~ 90 (quoting a June 12, 2002 MSL Press release in which Stewart stated 
that she sold her remaining ImClone shares in December 2001 pursuant to a long-
standing agreement with her broker and that she "did not have any nonpublic infor-
mation regarding ImClone when [she] sold" her shares). 
31 See Yahoo! Finance, Historical Prices for Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia 
Inc., http:/ /finance.yahoo.com/ q/hp?s=MSO&a=05&b=3&c=2002&d=07 &e=9&f= 
2002&g=d (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). 
32 See Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 
12-13 (Mar. 15, 2004) (disclosing that the company was named in seven securities 
class actions filed between August 6, 2002 and September 18, 2002). 
33 See id. at 13 (disclosing seven shareholder derivative suits, later consolidated 
into four derivative suits, filed between August 15, 2002 and September 29, 2003). 
34 See, e.g., Amended Complaint ~~ 59-65, Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961 (Del Ch. 2003) (C.A. No. 19844-NC), 2002 
WL 32904940 [hereinafter Derivative Complaint]. 
35 Securities Complaint, supra note 24, ~ 27. Compare id. (noting that at the time 
MSL went public the company warned that the business would be adversely affected if 
"Martha Stewart's public image or reputation were to be tarnished" (citing Martha 
Stewart living Omnimedia Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Form S-1 Registration Statement 
(Form S-1/A), at 14 (Oct. 18, 1999))), with Derivative Complaint, supra note 34, ~ 16 
(noting that MSL warned that" 'THE LOSS OF THE SERVICES OF MARTHA STEW-
ART ... WOULD MATERIALLY ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR REVENUES'" (quoting 
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Form S-1 Registration 
Statement (Form S-1/A), at 14 (Oct. 18, 1999))). 
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members of the Waksal family were selling their shares. 36 Both com-
plaints alleged that MSL and Stewart herself made false and mislead-
ing statements regarding the circumstances surrounding the stock 
sale.37 Both complaints alleged that Stewart's actions caused MSL's 
stock price to fall precipitously.38 Finally, both complaints named as 
defendants Stewart and Sharon Patrick, MSL's President and Chief 
Operating Officer.39 
The Martha Stewart cases are representative of a larger trend in 
corporate litigation. A growing number of shareholders are filing 
securities class actions and derivative suits based on nearly identical 
facts. 40 Indeed, there is a cottage industry of lawyers who piggyback 
on their arguably more industrious colleagues by monitoring the fil-
ing of securities class actions and then filing (a few short weeks later) 
nearly identical derivative suits. Many practitioners have recognized 
this trend, opining that "prudent defense attorneys should anticipate 
that a federal securities class lawsuit will give birth to ... a parallel 
36 See Securities Complaint, supra note 24, 'II 53 (alleging Stewart sold remaining 
3928 shares of ImClone after her broker told her that the Waksal family had sold its 
remaining shares); Derivative Complaint, supra note 34, 'II 30 (same). 
37 See, e.g., Securities Complaint, supra note 24, 'll'll 87, 90, 93; Derivative Com-
plaint, supra note 34, 'll'll 33-34, 38. 
38 See Securities Complaint, supra note 24, 'II 108 (stating that MSO shares 
declined from $19.40 to $6.78 after government investigation of Stewart was made 
public); Derivative Complaint, supra note 34, 'II 44 (stating that MSO common stock 
declined sixty-six percent from the time period when public investors had no informa-
tion regarding government investigation surrounding Stewart's sale of ImClone 
stock). 
39 See Securities Complaint, supra note 24, 'll'll 8-9; Derivative Complaint, supra 
note 34, 'll'll 2-3. 
40 See, e.g., Dell, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1-2 (Mar. 1, 2007) (disclos-
ing that the company was named in four securities class actions, seven derivative suits, 
and four ERlSA suits "all arising out of the same events and facts" related to the 
company's disclosures); Blue Rhino Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Oct. 21, 
2003) (disclosing that the company had been named in several securities class actions 
and derivative suits "all arising out of substantially the same alleged facts and circum-
stances" relating to the company's alleged failure to disclose certain facts related to 
various acquisitions and other transactions); Taser Int'!, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 
10-Q), at 12-13 (May 10, 2007) (disclosing that the company had been named in 
"numerous securities class action lawsuits" related to "the safety of the Company's 
products and the Company's ability to meet its sales goals" and that various sharehold-
ers had subsequently filed "numerous shareholder derivative actions ... based on 
similar facts and events as those alleged in the securities class action complaints"); 
Tibco Software Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Feb. 9, 2007) (announcing 
that the company had been named in three securities class actions and one derivative 
suit and that the derivative suit "was based on substantially similar facts and circum-
stances as the class actions"). 
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derivative lawsuit."41 Larry Ellison, the Chief Executive Office of Ora-
cle Corporation, even noted this phenomenon in a brief filed with the 
Supreme Court of California in which he argued that "shareholders 
have transformed the derivative action into a new way to litigate 
[securities] fraud actions."42 
The data supports these observations. It is increasingly common 
for shareholders to file parallel derivative suits on the heels of the 
filing of a securities class action. In 2005, thirty-five percent of securi-
ties class actions were accompanied by a parallel derivative suit.43 By 
2007, the number had risen to more than fifty-five percent.44 The 
cause of this increase is not known. One hypothesis is that the 
increase may reflect the dramatically escalating settlements in securi-
ties class actions, 45 providing financial incentives for attorneys to file 
related derivative claims in the hopes of getting a cut of the largesse of 
resulting attorneys' fees. 46 Regardless of the cause, however, there is 
little doubt that corporations increasingly find themselves on both 
sides of the aisle in courtroom battles involving similar parties and 
similar factual allegations. As we will now see, the corporation's strug-
gle to balance these dual roles is exacerbated by the fact that these 
lawsuits often turn on similar legal standards. 
41 David Priebe, Piling On: The Reemergence of the Parallel Derivative Lawsuit as the 
Federal Securities Class Action Window Closes, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1999, at 333, 335 
(PU Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1136, 1999); see also Peter 
M. Stone & Jay C. Gandhi, The "Clone" Derivative Lawsuit, ORANGE CouNTI LAWYER, 
July 2004, at 34 (referring to a "recent spate of 'clone' derivatives-lawsuits which 
merely replicate the allegations of federal securities class actions and reframe them as 
ordinary breach of fiduciary duty claims"). 
42 See Petition for Review at 9, Ellison v. Superior Court, Sl28367 (Cal. 2004), 
2004 WL 3080563 (quoting Michael A. Collora & David M. Osborne, Shareholders are 
Taking a Fresh Look at Derivative Suits To Pursue Investor Fraud Cases, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 15, 
1999 at BS). Ellison also claimed that "Silicon Valley companies, in particular, have 
seen a 'recent flurry of derivative suits' that 'use federal class actions as a springboard 
to allege fraud and insider trading'" and that "[i] t has gotten to the point that a 
federal securities fraud action now almost inevitably will be accompanied by a 'paral-
lel derivative lawsuit.'" Id. at 9 (quoting Renee Deger, State of Alert: Silicon Valley Corpo-
rate Firms On Guard As the Plaintiffs Bar Takes Securities Cases to State Court, S.F. 
REcoRDER, Aug. 9, 2001, at l; Priebe, supra note 41, at 335). 
43 LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2007 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 11, available at http:/ /www. 
comerstone.com/pdf/practice_securities/2007Settlements_Report.pdf. 
44 Id. 
45 See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 122-24. 
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3. Similar Legal Standards 
Over the last twenty-five years, corporate law has undergone a 
remarkable transformation, a transformation that is responsible in 
large part for the current conflict between securities class actions and 
derivative suits. Securities class actions and derivative suits have tradi-
tionally operated in separate legal spheres, representing an informal 
brokering of power between federal and state regulators. 47 Securities 
class actions are governed by federal law and are premised on disclo-
sure violations,48 while derivative suits are governed by state law and 
are premised on fiduciary duty violations. 49 These neat categories, 
however, mask an increasingly important overlap in the legal stan-
dards applicable in the two sets of claims. 
To survive a motion to dismiss in a securities class action,50 plain-
tiffs must allege facts creating a strong inference that the defendants 
acted with scienter, defined as a mental state embracing "intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud."51 Under this standard, plaintiffs 
can establish a violation of the federal securities laws by establishing 
that the defendants intended to deceive the market. Every circuit to 
address the issue has held that securities plaintiffs can also establish 
scienter through proof of recklessness.52 
In practice, this standard is extremely similar to the standard 
used in many derivative suits. Until the mid-1980s, the cornerstone of 
state corporate law was the business judgment rule. 53 This rule pro-
47 For a discussion of the role of federal and state law in preventing and deterring 
corporate misconduct, see Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 1753-54. 
48 See id. 
49 Lawton W. Hawkins, Exchange-nnhanced Special Litigation Committees: Enforcing 
Fiduciary Duties Amid a Crisis of Trust, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 587, 588. 
50 Surviving a motion to dismiss is a critical hurdle for plaintiffs in securities class 
actions, as nearly fony percent of securities class actions are dismissed at this stage. 
See TODD FosTER ET AL., NERA EcoN. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER 
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 4 (2007), http://nera.com/image/BRO_Recent_Trends_ 
SEC1288_FINAL_0307.pdf. 
51 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
52 See In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Van 
Dyke v. Coburn Enters., 873 F.2d 1094, llOO (8th Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Alan Bush 
Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 
lll4, lll7-18 (10th Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'I Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 
(5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 
1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 
1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977). 
53 See, e.g., David T. Bazelon, Clients Against Lawyers, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1967, at 
104 ("[The business judgment rule], which began as a minor exception, is now so 
dominant a winning argument that the only fun left is trying to prove that 
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tects corporate directors from liability as long as they "'[act] on an 
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.' "54 Although this rule 
has traditionally offered substantial protection to corporate managers, 
the Delaware Supreme Court undercut these protections in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom,55 a 1995 decision widely maligned by the legal and busi-
ness communities for its holding that independent directors can vio-
late their fiduciary duty to a corporation if they are not sufficiently 
informed prior to making a business decision. 56 In the wake of the 
furor resulting from this decision, the Delaware legislature amended 
its corporate code to permit corporations to provide their directors 
with greater protection from liability in suits brought by the corpora-
tion or on behalf of the corporation. 57 This statute offers protection 
to individual defendants in derivative suits well above the safeguards 
traditionally offered by the business judgment rule. 
Across the country, states rushed to follow Delaware's lead. Over 
the last twenty-five years, all fifty states have enacted statutes inviting 
corporations to exculpate their directors (and often officers) 58 from 
liability.59 Corporations have overwhelmingly accepted this invitation 
by adopting exculpation clauses that exculpate their directors and 
officers to the full extent of the law. A recent study found that "virtu-
[it] ... does not cover absolutely all forms of corporate theft."), quoted in Lyman P.Q. 
Johnson, Cmporate Officers and the Business judgment Rul£, 60 Bus. LAw. 439, 439 (2005). 
54 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (quoting 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
55 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
56 See id. at 893; Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer 
Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1131, 1141 
(2006) ("The business community-and perhaps more pertinently, their insurers-
were shocked by the outcome in Van Gorkom. . . . Van Gorkom appeared not to have 
applied the BJR so much as to have eviscerated it."). 
57 See DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (2001); see also Bernard S. Sharfman, 
Being Informed Does Matter: Fine Tuning Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years After Van 
Gorkom, 62 Bus. LAw. 135, 136-37 (2006) (tracing the history of Delaware's exculpa-
tion statute). 
58 See, e.g., Mo. CooE ANN., CTs. &Juo. PROC.§ 5-418 (LexisNexis 2006) (allowing 
corporations to exculpate their officers or directors); VA. CooE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 
(2006) (same). 
59 See]. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Cmporate Law in the Governance of 
Public Companies, 38 U. RicH. L. REv. 317, 332 n.93 (2004) (noting that by 2003, all 
fifty states had statutes enabling corporations to limit or eliminate personal liability 
for directors). 
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ally every firm making an SEC filing" between July 2001 and July 2002 
had included an exculpation clause in its charter.60 
The widespread adoption of exculpation clauses brought the 
applicable standard of liability in derivative suits much closer to the 
applicable standard of liability in securities class actions. Most excul-
pation statutes permit corporations to exculpate only those officers or 
directors who satisfy the standard of conduct specified in the statute. 
Delaware's exculpation statute, for example, states that a corporation 
cannot exculpate its directors for, inter alia, "any breach[es] of the 
director's duty ofloyalty" or "for acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation oflaw."61 
Other jurisdictions have adopted similar statutory standards. 62 As a 
result, to prevail on a fiduciary duty claim, shareholders generally 
have to prove that the individual defendants breached their duty of 
loyalty to the corporation, engaged in intentional misconduct or a 
knowing violation of the law, or failed to act in good faith. 
In practice, this standard eliminates a substantial percentage of 
potential derivative claims.63 The claims that remain, however, are 
often quite similar to federal securities claims.64 This similarity is most 
conspicuous in cases where shareholders have evidence of intentional 
(as opposed to reckless) misconduct, as such evidence provides the 
necessary ammunition to file both a securities class action and a deriv-
ative suit, at least if the shareholder can link the alleged misconduct to 
a false or misleading public statement. 
60 Celia R. Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Cmporate Managers 
Have Litt/,e to Fear and What Might Be Done About It, 85 OR. L. REv. 993, 1022-23 & n.131 
(2006) (writing that within one year of the date that Delaware enacted its statute 
permitting exculpation clauses, over ninety percent of a random selection of 180 law 
firms had adopted such a clause); see also Roberta Romano, Cmporate Governance in the 
Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY LJ. 1155, 1160-61 & n.11 (1990) (same). 
61 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7). 
62 See Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors' Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 
298-310 (1988) (comparing other states' statutes with Delaware statutory scheme). 
63 Davis, supra note 6, at 404 ("The exculpatory statutes and enhanced judicial 
deference to independent directors have combined to marginalize the derivative suit 
for cases not involving self-dealing or other palpable breaches of the duty ofloyalty."). 
64 This similarity is most pronounced in claims against large, public corporations 
alleging duty of care-type claims. As other scholars have noted, and as I discuss later 
in Part 111.C, the overlap between these lawsuits is less pronounced when the deriva-
tive claims allege more classic violations of the duty of loyalty. See Davis, supra note 6, 
at 439-50 (discussing the fact that a substantial number of derivative suits allege that a 
controlling shareholder exploited control of the corporation, allegations that can be 
more difficult to turn into the basis of a securities class action); infra notes 240-42 
and accompanying text. 
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Even where the shareholder's evidence does not rise to the level 
of intentional misconduct, the shareholder may still be able to satisfy 
the legal requirements for both types of claims. As noted above, Dela-
ware's exculpation statute prohibits corporations from exculpating 
their directors against conduct that is "not in good faith." 65 In the 
recent and well-known case involving the Walt Disney Company,66 the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that directors do not act in good faith 
when they are "motivated by subjective bad intent" or evince a "con-
scious disregard for one's responsibilities."67 This decision is consistent 
with earlier decisions by the Delaware Court of Chancery holding that 
a corporation cannot exculpate directors "who consciously and inten-
tionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a 'we don't care about 
the risks' attitude concerning a material corporate decision."68 
This standard is virtually indistinguishable from the recklessness 
standard described above under the federal securities laws. As the 
influential Second Circuit has stated, "allegations of recklessness [are] 
sufficient where plaintiffs alleged facts demonstrating that defendants 
failed to review or check information that they had a duty to monitor, 
or ignored obvious signs of fraud." 69 Other courts have explained that 
"recklessness, understood as a mental state apart from negligence and 
akin to conscious disregard, may constitute scienter."70 Under this for-
mulation, recklessness closely approaches that which attaches to con-
scious deception71 and applies when a defendant "turned a blind eye to 
the many red flags" 72 in a corporation's finances or business. 
These similar legal standards are on full display in the litigation 
that has followed the recent collapse of the subprime mortgage lend-
ing industry. Over the last several months, the U.S. economy has been 
battered as the once-profitable practice of giving home mortgages to 
borrowers with less-than-stellar credit histories has proven danger-
ously risky. 73 Only a handful of Fortune 500 corporations have been 
65 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7). 
66 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
67 Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added). 
68 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); see 
al,so In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 
1305745, at *43 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004). 
69 Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
70 In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
71 Id. 
72 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 679 
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (emphasis added). 
73 See Greg Ip, Study Finds Wider Impact of Mortgage Losses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 
2008, at A2. 
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hurt more by the economic downturn than Merrill Lynch, which 
announced in October 2007 that it would write down nearly $8 billion 
of mortgage-related securities. 74 Soon after this announcement, many 
Merrill Lynch shareholders filed securities class actions and derivative 
suits against Merrill Lynch and several of its officers and directors, 
alleging that the defendants misled the market by failing to disclose 
the actual risk exposure of its financial portfolio. 75 
The legal claims in the two sets of complaints are strikingly simi-
lar. For example, the shareholders in the securities class action 
alleged that Merrill Lynch's officers and directors "disseminated or 
approved ... false statements [regarding the corporation's risk portfo-
lio], which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading. "76 
Specifically, the securities plaintiffs claimed that the company's public 
statements "were materially false due to their failure to inform the 
market of the ticking time bomb in the Company's [mortgage] portfo-
lio," and that the defendants knew of the risks but "concealed [them] 
from the investing public."77 In the derivative suits, the shareholders 
were likely aware that Merrill Lynch had adopted an exculpation 
clause that protects the company's directors to the full extent permit-
ted under Delaware law. 78 Thus, they too claimed that the individual 
defendants had acted intentionally in misleading the market, alleging 
that "each of the [individual defendants] had actual or constructive 
knowledge that they had caused the Company to improperly misrep-
resent the financial results of the Company."79 The derivative plain-
tiffs also alleged that the individual defendants had "abandoned and 
abdicated their responsibilities and fiduciary duties with regard to 
prudently managing the assets and business of Merrill Lynch."80 
As the Merrill Lynch example illustrates, shareholders in securi-
ties class actions and derivative suits are often aiming at the same legal 
74 See Merrill Lynch & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 99.1 (Oct. 24, 
2007). 
75 See Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 134 (Feb. 25, 2008). 
76 Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws~ 47, Life 
Enrichment Found. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 1:07-9633 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 10, 
2007), available at http:/ /securities.stanford.edu/1038/MER_Ol/20071030_ffilc_ 
Life.pdf. Merrill Lynch's shareholders filed numerous securities class actions and 
derivative suits. This discussion focuses on representative complaints from one securi-
ties class action and one derivative suit. 
77 Id. ~ 9(b). 
78 See Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Merrill Lynch & Co., art. XIII, § 1 
(May 3, 2001), available at http://www.ml.com/media/14259.pdf. 
79 Verified Shareholder's Derivative Complaint~ 65, Arthur v. O'Neal, No. 1:07-
9696 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 1, 2007). 
80 Id.~ 81. 
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target.81 Coupled with the fact that these lawsuits often involve nearly 
identical players and nearly identical factual allegations, it is clear that 
these lawsuits are far more similar than they may appear at first 
glance. What do these similarities mean for corporations facing paral-
lel securities class actions and derivative suits? 
4. Consequences of the Similarities 
At bottom, the similarities mean that corporations cannot treat 
these lawsuits as unrelated legal battles for at least three reasons. 
First, plaintiffs may be able to use a corporation's victories in a deriva-
tive suit against the corporation in a related securities class action. 
Imagine, for example, that a derivative plaintiff proved that a corpora-
tion's Chief Executive Officer breached his fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration by intentionally misleading the market regarding the 
corporation's financial results. A securities plaintiff could use that rul-
ing as the foundation for its claims in the securities class action, just as 
Merrill Lynch or Martha Stewart's shareholders could try to use rul-
ings in the derivative suits described above against these corporations 
in the parallel securities class actions. 
Second, plaintiffs may be able to use a corporation's statements 
in a derivative suit against the corporation in a related securities class 
action. As explained in more detail below,82 state law permits corpo-
rations to form a committee of independent directors to review the 
allegations in a derivative suit, determine whether the suit is in the 
corporation's best interests, and recommend to the court whether the 
suit should proceed.83 The expectation is that these committees will 
provide a fulsome explanation of the various costs and benefits of the 
suit, including the legal merits of the claims. 84 If a committee con-
81 These concerns apply even if corporations do not have an applicable exculpa-
tion clause. Absent an exculpation clause, courts review fiduciary duty claims alleging 
a violation of the duty of care under the business judgment rule. See Desimone v. 
Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 933 (Del. Ch. 2007). The Delaware Supreme Court has lik-
ened this standard to one of gross negligence. See Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. 
Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 985 (Del. 2000). Allegations of gross negligence generally do 
not state a viable claim under the federal securities laws. See, e.g., DSAM Global Value 
Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 2002). However, securities 
plaintiffs may nonetheless be able to use information gleaned from the derivative case 
to help build their own cases. They will still need to prove that the officers and/ or 
directors violated the more stringent standard applicable in their cases, but this is 
obviously far easier than creating a case from scratch. 
82 See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. 
83 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981). 
84 No empirical evidence exists regarding the length of these committee reports, 
but these reports are far from short. The Delaware Chancery Court opined more 
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eludes that the individual officers and directors breached their fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation and provides factual and legal support for 
its conclusions, the securities plaintiff may be able to use the commit-
tee's report as an admission by the corporation in the securities class 
action. Not surprisingly, therefore, corporations are very nervous 
about committee recommendations when they have their financial 
futures on the line in parallel securities class actions. 
Third, these similarities can impact discovery, which has taken on 
monumental importance in securities class actions. Prior to 1995, dis-
covery abuse was rampant in these cases.85 According to a congres-
sional report, shareholders would file securities class actions on the 
barest of suspicion and then use discovery as a "fishing expedition" to 
find factual support for their claims.86 Many shareholders also lever-
aged the high cost of discovery to pressure corporations into settling 
meritless claims for millions of dollars.87 In an effort to stem these 
abuses, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
than twenty years ago that "the developing rule of thumb in this jurisdiction would 
appear to be that a report by a Special Litigation Committee recommending dismissal 
of a derivative suit must be at least 150 pages in length, exclusive of appendices and 
attachments." Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 510 (Del. Ch. 1984) ajfd, 499 A.2d 1184 
(Del. 1985). Over the last twenty years, reports have only grown in length. See, e.g., In 
re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 925 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that the 
committee in that case had produced a report totaling 1,110 pages, excluding exhib-
its and appendices). 
85 See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 338 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing 
plaintiffs prior to 1995 who "would use discovery to substantiate an initially frivolous 
complaint"); Choi, supra note 4, at 1469 (describing problems with discovery in secur-
ities class actions prior to enactment of the Reform Act); Cindy Krischer Goodman, 
Grin and Bear It? Shareholders Have Other Ideas When Stocks Sink, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 13, 
2000, § 6, at 1 (noting that 1995 enactment of the Private Securities Reform Litigation 
Act was designed to limit discovery and accordingly reduce the number of frivolous 
securities class actions). 
86 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) ("The House and Senate heard testimony 
that discovery in securities class actions often resembles a fishing expedition. As one 
witness noted, 'once the suit is filed, the plaintiff's law firm proceeds to search 
through all of the company's documents and take endless depositions for the slightest 
positive comment which they can claim induced the plaintiff to invest and any shred 
of evidence that the company knew a downturn was coming.'" (quoting testimony of 
Richard]. Egan, Chairman of EMC Corp.)). 
87 See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(discussing the need in securities class actions to deter "the use of the litigation pro-
cess as a device for extracting undeserved settlements as the price of avoiding the 
extensive discovery costs that frequently ensue once a complaint survives dismissal, 
even though no recovery would occur if the suit were litigated to completion"). 
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of 1995 (Reform Act),88 which prohibits plaintiffs in securities class 
actions from obtaining discovery until after they have survived a 
motion to dismiss.89 The Reform Act also established heightened 
pleading requirements that require courts to dismiss federal securities 
claims unless the plaintiff alleges "with particularity ... facts giving 
rise to a strong inference" that the defendants acted with the requisite 
state of mind.90 Thus, securities plaintiffs face the daunting pleading 
requirements of the Reform Act armed only with information that 
they have been able to glean from their own investigations. 
Or at least that was the goal of the Reform Act. In practice, share-
holders often attempt to use derivative suits to satisfy the high plead-
ing standards in securities class actions. Derivative plaintiffs are 
usually entitled to discovery far earlier than their securities counter-
parts,91 and there are typically no restrictions on the ability of deriva-
tive plaintiffs to share the fruits of their discovery with securities 
plaintiffs in corresponding securities class actions.92 As a result, secur-
ities plaintiffs may be able to circumvent the Reform Act's restrictions 
on discovery by obtaining discovery material from the derivative plain-
tiffs. The securities plaintiffs can then use this information to bolster 
their own complaints and increase their likelihood of surviving a 
motion to dismiss. 
The sharing of discovery material between derivative and class 
plaintiffs is particularly worrisome to corporations because derivative 
88 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
89 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
90 Id. § 78u-4(b) (2). 
91 See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE AcnoNs § 4.15 (1994) 
(explaining that derivative suits are generally subject to the same discovery rules appli-
cable to all civil actions). 
92 Some corporations have been successful in obtaining a court order prohibiting 
derivative plaintiffs from sharing discovery with securities plaintiffs under a provision 
of the Reform Act that permits federal courts to stay discovery in a state derivative 
action if such a stay is "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" or "to protect or [to] effec-
tuate its judgments." See In re DPL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 247 F. Supp. 2d 946, 950 (S.D. 
Ohio 2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (D) ); see also Jn re Cardinal Health, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 365 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871-72 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (stating that '"upon a 
proper showing'" a court may stay proceedings "'as necessary in aid of its jurisdic-
tion"' or '"to protect or effectuate its judgments"' (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b) (3) (D)) ). Some states have also adopted rules making it more difficult for share-
holder plaintiffs to obtain discovery. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 208-09 
(Del. 1991) (holding that a shareholder alleging that a pre litigation demand on 
directors has been wrongfully refused is not entitled to discovery prior to responding 
to a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss). These measures, however, are not common and do 
not ameliorate the other problems associated with parallel lawsuits. 
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plaintiffs are often entitled to discovery material that would otherwise 
be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Courts around the coun-
try have adopted the rule first established by the Fifth Circuit in Gar-
ner v. Wo!finbargef!3 that derivative plaintiffs are entitled to otherwise 
privileged communications between the corporation's counsel and its 
employees upon a showing of good cause.94 Some courts, however, 
have refused or expressed reluctance to extend the exception to 
shareholders in securities class actions, reasoning that shareholders in 
a securities class action seek to recover only for themselves and other 
class members and therefore their interests are adverse to the interests 
of the corporation.95 Accordingly, not only do derivative plaintiffs get 
discovery earlier than securities plaintiffs, they also get more 
discovery. 
Do these litigation risks matter? According to the conventional 
wisdom, they do not. Applying the conventional wisdom, there is no 
conflict between securities class actions and derivative suits because, 
even if a derivative suit causes a corporation to incur additional losses 
in a securities class action, the corporation can simply recoup these 
losses in the derivative suit. In short, the conventional wisdom rests 
on the assumption that corporations can actually recoup their losses 
in derivative suits. If this assumption is wrong, then corporate law has 
placed corporations in a far more perilous position than legal scholars 
have recognized. 
B. Deciphering Differences 
1. Differences in Damages 
The conventional wisdom starts to break down when damages are 
added to the mix because corporations often cannot use derivative 
suits to recoup their losses in securities class actions. To understand 
this point, imagine a case in which a corporation's Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) intentionally causes the corporation to misstate its 
financial results, leading to a $100 million settlement in a securities 
93 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). 
94 See id. at 1103-04; see also Sandberg v. Va. Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 352 
(4th Cir. 1992) ("The Gamer good faith exception has become accepted doctrine."), 
vacated, 1993 WL 524680 (4th Cir. 1993); Grimes v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 724 A.2d 
561, 568 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("In determining whether a stockholder has shown sufficient 
'good cause' to preclude application of the attorney-client privilege, Delaware courts 
follow the approach outlined in Gamer."). 
95 See Sandberg, 979 F.2d at 353-54; Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 
786 (5th Cir. 1988); Weil v. Inv./lndicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 23 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
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class action. The corporation can try to recover this amount, as well as 
the corporation's litigation costs and any other expenses associated 
with the misstatement, in a derivative suit. If the corporation is able to 
recover $100 million or more from the CFO, there would be no con-
flict between the two suits because the corporation would be able to 
recoup in one lawsuit what it lost in the other. This logic applies even 
if the existence of the derivative suit increases the amount of money 
paid in the securities class action. 
The reality, however, is often far from this neat picture. Corpora-
tions face serious hurdles in recovering their full damages in deriva-
tive suits, hurdles that result in large part from the fact that the 
defendants in derivative suits are almost always individuals.96 Individ-
ual defendants may have the personal resources to satisfy relatively 
small judgments, but few corporate executives can afford to pay the 
mega-settlements that are increasingly common in securities class 
actions. According to a recent study by Cornerstone Research, the 
median settlement in securities class actions in 2007 was $9 million, 
while the average settlement was $62. 7 million.97 Even wealthy indi-
vidual defendants are hard-pressed to satisfy these types of large dam-
age awards, especially considering that these defendants often face 
multiple other lawsuits98 and thus multiple other claims on their 
assets.99 
In contrast to the large settlements in securities class actions, the 
settlements in derivative suits are far smaller. There is little empirical 
data on settlement amounts in derivative suits, 100 but the anecdotal 
96 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993) ("Derivative suits have 
been used most frequently as a means of redressing harm to a corporation allegedly 
resulting from misconduct by its directors." (emphasis added)). 
97 SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 43, at 2; see also James D. Cox & Randall S. 
Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities 
Class Actions, 106 CoLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1624 (2006) (finding that the median settle-
ments in securities class actions since the 1995 passage of the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act was approximately $5.7 million). 
98 See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text. 
99 Colloquy, The Role of Cmporate Litigation in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL J. 
CORP. L. 131, 151 (2000) ("[T]here's only so much blood you can get out of individ-
ual directors."). 
100 A 1991 study by Roberta Romano found that only one-half of the settlements of 
the derivative suits examined ended with the corporation receiving a monetary pay-
out, and that the average monetary payout in these suits was approximately $6 mil-
lion. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. 
EcoN. & 0RG. 55, 61 (1991). As more than fifteen years have passed since Romano's 
study, the statistics may look very different today. Similarly, Professors Thompson and 
Thomas' study of all of the derivative suits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 
1999 and 2000 found that of the sixteen cases that ended with some type of affirma-
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evidence suggests that many of these settlements are largely nominal, 
consisting of agreements by the corporation to implement small-scale 
corporate governance reforms. 101 Even in the more high-profile 
derivative suits that attract parallel securities class actions, the typical 
settlement does not come anywhere near $9 million, much less $62. 7 
million. 102 As a result, corporations face a significant discrepancy in 
the amount of money that they must pay out in a securities class 
action as a result of the individual defendants' conduct and the 
amount of money that they can recover from these same individuals in 
a parallel derivative suit. 
This discrepancy would not be a problem if corporations could 
use insurance to bridge the gap. They often cannot. Most corpora-
tions have directors & officers (D&O) insurance, which protects cor-
porations against losses caused by their directors and officers.103 In 
theory, if our hypothetical CFO does not have $100 million to satisfy a 
judgment in the derivative suit, the corporation may be able to 
recover this amount from its D&O policy, preventing the corporation 
from suffering a net loss as a result of the two suits. This theory, how-
ever, breaks down for at least two reasons. 
First, all D&O policies have maximum policy limits, 104 which cor-
porations can exhaust early and easily in the litigation battles that fol-
low on the heels of corporate scandal.105 The policy limit for the 
average D&O policy in 2006 was $9.86 million, 106 close to the median 
tive relief for the corporation (all through settlements), only six of these settlements 
involved monetary relief, while the remaining ten settlements involved some other 
type of non-monetary relief. See Thompson & Thoma~, supra note 4, at 1776. 
101 SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 43, at 11 ("Derivative cases are often resolved with 
changes to the issuer's corporate governance practices and little or no cash 
payment .... "). 
102 See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 1776-77. Indeed, in situations 
where the corporation simultaneously settles a securities class action and derivative 
suit, the settlement of the derivative suit is often simply folded into the larger settle-
ment of the securities class action with the corporation receiving little or no separate 
monetary benefit from settling the derivative suit. See, e.g., In re Ikon Office Solutions, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 191 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
103 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 12, at 494 (explaining that public corporations 
have a significant need for D&O insurance as a result of shareholder litigation). 
104 See Matthew Brodsky, The Soft Side of .Executive Scandals: D&O Coverage Seems 
More Important These Days, and Luckily, It's Cheap, RisK & INs., Apr. 1, 2006, at 10, 10. 
105 A 1991 study revealed that D&O insurance pays only fifty to eighty percent of 
the settlement monies in securities class actions. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the 
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 550 
(1991). 
106 See Tov.'ERS PERRIN, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY: 2007 SuR'.'EY OF INSUR-
ANCE PURCHASING Al"ID CLAIM TRENDS 14 (2008). Not surprisingly, the largest compa-
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settlement amount in securities class actions. 107 Corporations often 
use a substantial portion of their insurance proceeds to pay litigation 
costs, leaving even less money to fund settlements in securities class 
actions. 108 As a result, it is not uncommon for corporations to have to 
reach into their own pockets to pay sizable settlement amounts in 
securities class actions. 10 9 
Second, the timing of the two lawsuits makes it difficult for corpo-
rations to predict with any confidence the extent to which their losses 
in the securities class action will be covered by insurance. This point 
is tricky, but important. Imagine that our hypothetical corporation 
knows that it has $20 million in insurance coverag.e and that it will 
eventually settle the securities class action for $10 million. Under 
these facts, the corporation will not be overly concerned about the 
securities class action because the corporation knows that it will not 
have to pay any money out of its own pocket.110 Now imagine that the 
corporation knows that the facts uncovered in the derivative suit will 
push the settlement in the securities class action up to $15 million. 
The corporation will still not be overly concerned because it still 
knows that all of its losses will be covered by insurance. 111 
nies report the largest policy limits. Companies with over $10 billion in assets report 
average policy limits of approximately $146 million. See id. 
107 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
108 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: 
The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. LJ. 1795, 1815 (2007). 
109 See, e.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 12, at 488 n.3 ("There may be a recent 
trend in the U.S. toward increasing (but still small) numbers of settlements above the 
D&O policy limits."); see also Press Release, CryoLife, Inc., CryoLife Announces Agree-
ments in Principle to Settle Shareholder Class Action and Shareholder Derivative 
Action Lawsuits Quly 28, 2005), availabf,e at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix. 
zhtml?c=80253&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=736340&highlight= (announcing that the 
company had agreed to settle a securities class action for $23.25 million, approxi-
mately $11.5 million of which would be paid from insurance proceeds); Press Release, 
DHB Indus., Inc., DHB Industry Enters into Memorandum of Understanding to Set-
tle Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits Quly 13, 2006), availabf,e at http:/ /phx.corpo-
rate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=75442&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=l074443&highlight= 
(announcing that the company had agreed to settle a securities class action and deriv-
ative suit for $34.9 million in cash, of which $12.9 million would be paid by the com-
pany's D&O carrier). 
110 As Professors Baker and Griffith have noted in a forthcoming article, when 
boards learn that the entire settlement in a securities class action will be funded by 
insurance, "[t]he next question is 'What time is lunch?'" Tom Baker & Sean J. Grif-
fith, How the Merits Matter: D&O Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 38-39), availab/,e at http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=l 10 
1068. 
111 This example is obviously oversimplified. The corporation will only be content 
to allow the derivative suit to move forward if the corporation is also compensated for 
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In the real world, of course, corporations have no such looking 
glass. Corporations do not know the eventual impact of a derivative 
suit on a securities class action at the time that they are evaluating the 
merits of the derivative suit. In most instances, shareholders pursue 
securities class actions and derivative suits simultaneously, and courts 
typically require corporations to evaluate derivative suits soon after 
they are filed. 112 The corporation does not know at that time whether 
facts uncovered in the derivative suit will push the settlement in the 
securities class action to $15 million, $150 million, or even $1.5 bil-
lion.113 In light of this uncertainty, many corporations rationally 
decide to hedge their bets and seek dismissal of derivative suits. 
It is important to note that corporations do not forgo any of their 
insurance proceeds by hedging their bets in this way. Generally speak-
ing, a corporation is entitled to insurance reimbursement of settle-
ments amounts paid in a securities class action even if the corporation 
does not pursue a derivative suit against the alleged wrongdoers. 114 
Thus, a derivative suit may well increase the amount of money that the 
corporation ends up paying in the securities class action, while bring-
ing in little additional money. 
From the corporation's perspective, therefore, the filing of a par-
allel derivative suit may have substantial cost but little reward. This 
fact raises one last question in the effort to understand the conflict 
between securities class actions and derivative suits: given the impact 
of derivative suits on parallel securities class actions, why do share-
holders file them? 
all of the costs related to the increased settlement in the securities class action, includ-
ing legal fees, lost time of executives, additional negative publicity, and future 
increases in its insurance premiums. 
112 See, e.g., Abbey v. Computer & Commc'ns Tech. Corp., 457 A.2d 368, 375 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (holding that a derivative suit should only be stayed for a "reasonable time" 
to permit an SLC to complete its investigation). 
113 The corporation can try to predict its exposure, of course, based on the drop 
in the company's stock price during the relevant time period and other factors, but its 
predictions will likely be far from perfect, especially prior to discovery. 
114 See Lisa L. Casey, R.eforming Securities Class Action from the Bench: judging Fiducia-
ries and Fiduciary judging, 2003 BYU L. REv. 1239, n.91 ("[M]ost negotiated resolutions 
of securities class actions follow a similar pattern. The settling defendants, while 
denying all wrongdoing, agree to pay to the class some amount of money and/ or 
securities, often funded with the proceeds of directors' and officers' liability insur-
ance, into a fund from which class members may make claims and class counsel will 
receive compensation and reimbursement of costs."). 
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2. Differences in Interest 
The reason is simple. Shareholders' interests, and the interests of 
their attorneys, are not always aligned with the interests of plaintiff 
corporations. 115 Although derivative plaintiffs have a fiduciary duty to 
act in a corporation's best interests,116 they generally lack the incen-
tives to carry out this duty properly. A shareholder can bring a deriva-
tive suit if he owns only a single share of stock, 117 and many derivative 
plaintiffs own little more than this single share, 118 as reflected in the 
fact that large investors, including institutional investors, rarely serve 
as derivative plaintiffs.119 A derivative plaintiff who owns only a few 
shares of stock is unlikely to see any real benefit from a derivative suit 
because any recovery in a derivative suit is returned to the corporation 
and even a substantial recovery for the corporation will provide only a 
small pro rata indirect benefit to the shareholder. As a result, share-
holders who agree to serve as representative plaintiffs do not have the 
financial incentives to ensure that a derivative suit is in the best inter-
ests of the plaintiff corporation.120 
115 See James D. Cox, Heroes in the Law: Alford v. Shaw, 66 N.C. L. REv. 565, 570 
(1988) ("The central problem with derivative suit litigation is the weak incentives of 
each of the suit's participants to serve the corporation's interests."). 
116 See, e.g., Breault v. Folino, No. SACV010826GLTANX, 2002 WL 31974381, at *l 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2002); Goodwin v. Castleton, 144 P.2d 725, 732 (Wash. 1944). 
117 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (requiring only that the derivative plaintiff allege that 
he or she "was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction complained 
of'). 
118 See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the fact that 
the shareholder plaintiff owned only 100 out of 8 million outstanding shares was 
"irrelevant"); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 25 (N.D. Ill. 1980) 
(holding that plaintiffs adequately represented the corporation even though they 
together owned only 0.7% of the corporation's outstanding shares). 
119 See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the 
Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 lowA L. REv. 1305, 1355-56 (2005) ("While often 
appearing as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions, [institutional investors] have 
rarely done so in derivative suits."). 
120 In response to this point, one might ask why shareholders bother to serve as 
derivative plaintiffs when the financial rewards are so minimal. There is no empirical 
research on this question, but anecdotal evidence suggests that many derivative plain-
tiffs lend their name to the suit because they are angry that alleged corporate miscon-
duct caused them financial harm and want to punish the wrongdoer. See, e.g., David 
A. Skeel,Jr., Shamingin Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1811, 1823-26 (2001). Alter-
natively, plaintiffs may view themselves as "corporate gadflies" who view their stock 
ownership as a means of enforcing corporate norms in society generally. Charles M. 
Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1867, 1906 (reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)). In such 
instances, the derivative plaintiff's interests are not aligned with the corporation's 
interests because the plaintiff is more interested in deterring corporate misconduct 
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Nor do their attorneys. As the Second Circuit has stated, "The 
real incentive to bring derivative actions is usually not the hope of 
return to the corporation but the hope of handsome fees to be recov-
ered by plaintiffs' counsel."121 As this quote illustrates, attorneys have 
their own financial incentives to file derivative suits, and these incen-
tives are not always consistent with the best interests of the plaintiff 
corporation. Plaintiffs' attorneys typically receive a percentage-
often between twenty and thirty percent-of a plaintiff corporation's 
recovery regardless of the costs of the suit. 122 For plaintiffs' attorneys, 
therefore, it does not matter whether derivative suits cause corpora-
tions to incur substantial losses in securities class actions because such 
losses are not factored into their fees. If a plaintiff corporation recov-
ers $5 million in a derivative suit, the plaintiff's attorney will likely be 
entitled to more than $1 million in fees, even if the suit costs the cor-
poration $10 million in related litigation. As a result, the only ques-
tion for a plaintiff's attorney is whether the expected value of the suit, 
discounted by the probability of success, is greater than the attorney's 
other litigation opportunities.123 Given this calculus, it is not surpris-
ing that derivative plaintiffs file derivative suits that are not in the best 
interest of plaintiff corporations. 
In sum, the conventional wisdom is wrong. The perfect storm of 
shareholder litigation is real, and it has real consequences for the cor-
porations struggling to juggle their conflicting roles in these lawsuits. 
Corporations named in parallel securities class actions and derivative 
suits have legitimate reason to fear that their offensive position in the 
derivative suit may threaten their defensive position in the securities 
class action. The question for courts and legal scholars is how to 
resolve these conflicting roles in a way that is consistent with the 
underlying goals of shareholder litigation. 
generally than in ensuring that the corporation is compensated for its own managers' 
alleged misdeeds. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why 
the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Mn. L. REv. 215, 218 (1983) 
(noting the "conventional theory" that the "role of private litigation is not simply to 
secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to generate deterrence"). 
121 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982). 
122. See 4 ALBA CoNTE & HERBERT B. NE'NBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcnoNs § 14.6 
(4th ed. 2002) (stating that the usual attorneys' fee award is twenty to thirty-three 
percent of a common fund). 
123 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Who Represents the Corporation? In Search of a Better 
Method for Determining the Corporate Interest in Derivative Suits, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 265, 
290-91 (1985) (explaining the calculus for plaintiffs' attorneys). 
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II. POLICY AND PRACTICE 
As we have seen, legal theory does not match legal reality when it 
comes to shareholder litigation. The conventional theory of share-
holder litigation-which is based on viewing securities class actions 
and derivative suits as discrete and unrelated events-is fundamen-
tally flawed. The focus now turns to crafting a new theory of share-
holder litigation. This task has evaded courts thus far, largely because 
courts have been ambivalent about the underlying goals of share-
holder litigation. Shareholder litigation has long had lofty ambitions. 
It is intended to compensate parties injured by corporate miscon-
duct-including shareholders and plaintiff corporations-but it is 
also supposed to benefit society as a whole by punishing those who 
engage in market-related misconduct and by deterring others from 
engaging in similar misconduct. The following discussion first exam-
ines these diverse goals, and then explores how these goals have 
impacted judicial efforts to reconcile the conflict between securities 
class actions and derivative suits. 
A. The Public and Private Goals of Derivative Suits 
All litigation serves public and private interests.124 When an 
employee sues her employer for sexual harassment, she is seeking 
redress for her own injuries, but she is also sending a message to all 
employers that sexual harassment will not be tolerated in the work-
place. When a company sues one of its suppliers for breach of con-
tract, the company is seeking compensation for its own damages, but 
it is also reinforcing the legal norm that companies should keep their 
promises (or pay the resulting damages). 
In most civil lawsuits, however, the private interests trump the 
public interests, at least when it comes to certain fundamental deci-
sions about the lawsuit such as whether to sue and whether to main-
tain the suit once filed. In a sexual harassment case, for example, the 
plaintiff is entitled to decide whether she wants to press forward with 
her claims, even if society's interests point toward a different decision. 
Similarly, a company with a meritorious breach of contract claim is 
permitted to settle the suit to maintain its business relationship with 
the supplier, even if the settlement does not reinforce important legal 
124 Cf. William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2129, 2131 (2004) ("[T]here are so many players [in litiga-
tion] who mix public and private functions in so many different ways ... [that] 
'[a]nyone ... can call himself a "private attorney general."'" (quoting Jeremy A. 
Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 179, 
194 (1998))). 
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norms to the same extent as a full trial and judgment on the merits. 
These decisions rest with the plaintiffs, not with the public at large. 
In theory, derivative suits should be no different. And yet they 
are, at least in the eyes of many scholars. Legal academics have 
devoted a substantial amount of ink to debating whether the public or 
private interests of derivative suits should reign supreme in these 
suits. 125 This debate has occurred because derivative suits are differ-
ent from other types of private litigation. Unlike in other private liti-
gation, the true parties in interest in derivative suits-plaintiff 
corporations-do not control these suits, and thus there is potentially 
more room for public concerns to shape derivative suits than in other 
types of private litigation. 126 Third parties overseeing the litigation, 
including derivative plaintiffs, their attorneys, and courts, may decide 
that the interests of the plaintiff corporation are not as important as 
the public interests-punishing the alleged wrongdoer, deterring sim-
ilar misconduct in the future, 127 or even creating new legal precedent 
that will further advance the development of the law. 128 In this way, 
derivative plaintiffs play a role in derivative suits that looks more like 
the role played by private attorney generals than the role played by 
typical plaintiffs. 
125 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative 
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 307-08 
(1981) ("The differences between deterrent and compensatory rationales come into 
clearest focus when one poses the hardest practical questions about derivative litiga-
tion: Should a court dismiss an otherwise meritorious derivative action if it appears 
that costs of litigation will exceed the likely recovery?"); Cox, supra note 4, at 13 
("[T]he public role of shareholder suits is muted, and indeed obfuscated, both by the 
characterization of their mission as the compensation of those harmed by the defen-
dant's misconduct and by the nurturing of settlements through the courts' extraordi-
nary deference to the bargain struck by the suit's attorneys. In the end, shareholder 
suits have but a private existence so that in the public's eye they are just another 
commercial dispute."); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 1774 ("There are two 
main benefits that result from derivative suits: (1) the deterrence of corporate wrong-
doing provided by their very existence, and (2) the possibility that the suits yield a 
positive net recovery for shareholders."). 
126 Coffee, supra note 120, at 218 ("The conventional theory of the private attor-
ney general stresses that the role of private litigation is not simply to secure compen-
sation for victims, but is at least equally to generate deterrence, principally by 
multiplying the total resources committed to the detection and prosecution of the 
prohibited behavior."). 
127 See id. 
128 See Colloquy, supra note 99, at 155 (stating that Delaware corporate law can 
only develop through litigation); Davis, supra note 6, at 435 (discussing "the produc-
tion of precedent" as another "public good that sometimes is cited on behalf of deriv-
ative litigation"). 
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These unique characteristics have led to two models of derivative 
suits. The first model-the private model-is based on the belief that 
derivative suits are designed primarily to compensate plaintiff corpo-
rations for losses that they have sustained. This model is focused on 
the interests of the plaintiff corporation. The second model-the 
public model-is based on the belief that these suits are designed to 
serve broader social goals such as deterring future legal violations by 
managers in corporate America. 129 This model preferences the inter-
ests of society over the interests of the plaintiff corporation. 
Courts have traditionally resisted exhortations to preference the 
public model of derivative suits over the private model,130 as reflected 
in two important procedural rules governing derivative suits. 131 First, 
under the contemporaneous ownership rule, derivative plaintiffs can 
maintain derivative suits only if they owned stock in the plaintiff cor-
porations at the time of the transactions at issue. 132 The shareholders 
must also hold their stock for the duration of the lawsuit. 133 This rule 
is based on the private model of derivative suits. 134 If the sole goal of 
such suits were to deter and punish corporate misconduct, there 
would be no need to limit the universe of potential plaintiffs. Enter-
prising plaintiffs' lawyers could sue on behalf of anyone to rectify 
alleged harms committed against plaintiff corporations. Limiting the 
129 I am distinguishing here general deterrence, or deterrence in society gener-
ally, from specific deterrence, or deterrence directed at the plaintiff corporation. See 
Hawkins, supra note 49, at 593-95. The desire for general deterrence comes within 
the scope of the public model, while the desire for specific deterrence would come 
within the private model. 
130 See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 125, at 302 (noting that the public 
model "has never been the dominant rationale" for derivative suits, and "indeed some 
decisions appear frankly skeptical of it"). 
131 These rules have been met with much scholarly resistance, which courts and 
legislators have traditionally ignored. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 8 ("[I]n the cor-
porate setting, shareholder suits are consistently dismissed when they fail to serve a 
compensatory end, even though the goal of deterrence would be advanced by the 
suit's successful prosecution. Simply stated, compensation is the prevailing objective 
of shareholder suits and deterrence, its valuable byproduct."). 
132 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (a); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2001 ); see also Strategic 
Asset Mgmt. v. Nicholson, No. 20360-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 30, 2004) ("The 'continuous ownership' requirement is a fundamental and 
ongoing burden that a plaintiff in a Delaware derivative action must satisfy."). 
133 See 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI &JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAw OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS§ 13.11, at 13-33 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2008). 
134 The American Law Institute has proposed that states relax the contemporane-
ous ownership rule to allow directors of corporations to file derivative suits, but the 
motivation for the proposal appears to be to to increase the number of plaintiffs likely 
to act in the corporation's interest, not to change the purpose of these suits. See2 AM. 
LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE§ 7.02(c) & cmts. (1994). 
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class of potential plaintiffs to a plaintiff corporation's stockholders, 
however, may mean that some meritorious claims are never brought 
simply because the corporation's shareholders are not aware of the 
alleged wrongdoing or do not want to invest the (admittedly minimal) 
time and resources necessary to bring a lawsuit.I 35 
Second, courts have adopted the net-loss rule, which prohibits 
shareholders from pursuing a derivative suit unless the plaintiff corpo-
ration suffered a net loss as a result of the alleged wrongdoing. 136 As a 
result of the net-loss rule, corporate managers can escape liability to 
the corporation even if they engaged in flagrant violations of the 
law-such as falsifying financial results, bribing foreign officials, or 
price fixing-as long as their actions did not harm the corporation. 137 
These rules do not mean that the social impact of derivative suits 
is irrelevant. They do, however, suggest that it is not enough to argue 
that the defendants engaged in misconduct, even egregious miscon-
duct, that violated the law. Rather, derivative plaintiffs must prove 
that there is a compensatory aspect to their suits. The plaintiff corpo-
ration remains the real party in interest, and any suit brought on its 
behalf must reflect this fact. 
As these rules illustrate, the private model of derivative suits has 
traditionally prevailed over the public model, despite the unique char-
135 See Lawrence A. Larose, Suing in the Right of the Corporation: A Commentary and 
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 499, 514 (1986) (arguing that 
allowing a wider range of plaintiffs would allow more effective sanctions against cor-
porate wrongdoers). 
136 This requirement stems from a series of New York state cases, particularly in 
the antitrust context. The defendants in these cases argued that the cases should be 
dismissed because the derivative plaintiffs failed to allege that the plaintiff corpora-
tions suffered a net loss as a result of the defendants' conduct. The defendants sug-
gested that the derivative plaintiffs had failed to include such allegations because the 
defendants' conduct had actually benefited the plaintiff corporations. See, e.g., Bor-
den v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); Spinella v. Heights Ice 
Corp., 62 N.Y.S.2d 263, 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946); Diamond v. Davis, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). The courts held that the derivative plaintiffs' allegations were 
insufficient because there is no "actionable claim unless the acts otherwise worked 
harm to the corporation." Borden, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 903; see also Spinella, 62 N.Y.S.2d at 
263 (holding that the derivative complaint was "insufficient in law" because there was 
no demonstration of damage to the corporation); Diamond, 31 N.Y.S. 2d at 584 (dis-
missing the suit because, inter alia, the acts complained of were "not such that the 
injury to the corporation would ordinarily be inferred" from them). 
137 See Cox, supra note 4, at 8-9 ("[D]irectors who knowingly violate the law are 
not without a defense. Absent proof that the corporation suffered a net loss through 
their illegal act, the suit must be dismissed. Therefore, if the plaintiff fails to establish 
that the harm suffered by the corporation as a consequence of the misconduct 
exceeded the benefits it received by their misconduct, the defendant escapes any 
sanction by a derivative suit."). 
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acteristics of derivative suits. This is not surprising when one consid-
ers the interplay between public and private interests in most 
derivative suits. With the contemporaneous ownership requirement, 
for example, some cases may fall through the cracks, but there is likely 
to be at least one shareholder willing to serve as a derivative share-
holder in the most egregious cases. In such cases, attorneys are more 
likely to spend the resources to locate a derivative plaintiff, and share-
holders are more likely to hear about the alleged wrongdoing and be 
willing to serve as a named plaintiff. As a result, while there may not 
be a willing plaintiff in every case, there likely will be a willing plaintiff 
in the cases involving the most glaring examples of corporate 
misconduct. 
As we shall see in the next section, judges are less confident that 
the public interest will be vindicated when it comes to the conflict 
between securities class actions and derivative suits. Accordingly, the 
legal landscape looks quite different when a corporation asks a court 
to dismiss a derivative suit that conflicts with the corporation's posi-
tion in a securities class action. This difference reflects a fundamental 
fact about shareholder litigation: the more egregious the allegations, 
the more lawsuits shareholders are likely to file. 138 As a result, a cor-
poration is most likely to be named in parallel shareholder litigation 
in precisely the cases that society most wants to deter. This point is 
especially worrisome for courts that take a narrow view of shareholder 
litigation, focusing only on a single derivative suit before them, rather 
than the ability of securities class actions and derivative suits to work 
together to achieve important deterrent and compensatory goals. We 
return to these two vantage points in Part III, but, as we will now see, 
for judges focusing on the single derivative suit before them, the 
choice is stark, Should they dismiss derivative suits raising allegations 
of serious corporate misconduct if these suits are likely to threaten the 
defensive positions of corporations in related securities class actions? 
Or should they further minimize the role of corporations in derivative 
suits by permitting shareholder plaintiffs to pursue suits that are not 
in the best interests of the corporations on whose behalf these suits 
are brought? 
138 See, e.g., SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 43, at 11-13 (finding that securities class 
actions with high estimated damages are more likely to be accompanied by derivative 
suits or SEC enforcement actions than securities class actions with lower estimated 
damages) ;James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical 
Inquiry, 53 DuKE LJ. 737, 763-77 (2003). 
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B. Putting Policy into Practice 
1. Procedural Backdrop 
Courts face these questions at a key moment in derivative suits: 
the moment when the plaintiff corporation finally makes its voice 
heard. Following the filing of a derivative suit, or upon the receipt of 
a demand from a shareholder that the corporation itself file a deriva-
tive suit, the plaintiff corporation often forms a committee of inde-
pendent directors-directors without a personal interest in the 
outcome of the suit-to evaluate the allegations in the suit and decide 
whether the suit is in the corporation's best interest. 139 This commit-
tee is called a special litigation committee, or SLC. If the SLC deter-
mines that the suit is not in the plaintiff corporation's best interests, it 
will decline to pursue the suit, and if the suit has already been filed, 
the SLC will recommend that the court stay or dismiss the suit. 140 If 
the SLC determines that the suit is in the plaintiff corporation's best 
interests, it will typically recommend that the SLC take control of the 
suit and pursue redress against the individual defendants.141 
The SLC process underscores the plaintiff corporation's role and 
importance in the litigation. It is designed to ensure that the suit 
remains focused on the best interests of the plaintiff corporation. 142 
As the conflict between securities class actions and derivative suits 
demonstrates, a derivative suit may be an easy win for the derivative 
shareholder and still not be in the plaintiff corporation's best inter-
ests. SLCs must therefore perform both a legal role and a managerial 
role in deciding whether to recommend that a derivative suit go for-
ward. This process essentially mimics the process that general coun-
sels use when reviewing other types of cases in which the corporation 
is a potential party. 
Once an SLC makes its recommendation, the focus shifts to the 
reviewing court, which must decide whether to accept the recommen-
dation. The level of deference to the SLC's recommendation 
depends on state law.143 Some jurisdictions require the reviewing 
139 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981). 
140 See id. at 788; see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of 
Unlimited Liability Companies, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 63, 81-86 (2006) (detailing SLC 
procedures). 
141 See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 788. 
142 See id. ("The basis of the [plaintiff corporation's] motion is the best interests of 
the corporation, as determined by the committee."). 
143 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550 (1949) (holding 
that states have "plenary power" over derivative suits). This section discusses the rele-
vant standards for so-called demand excused cases, or cases where the court has deter-
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court to dismiss a derivative suit pursuant to an SLC recommendation 
if the court concludes that the SLC was independent and conducted 
an adequate investigation. 144 Other jurisdictions, including influen-
tial Delaware, provide for greater judicial scrutiny. In Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 145 the Delaware Supreme Court established a two-step pro-
cess of review to evaluate SLC recommendations. The court must first 
determine whether the SLC was independent, acted in good faith, 
and had a reasonable basis for its decision. 146 
If these threshold standards are met, the court can then exercise 
its own "independent business judgment" to determine whether the 
suit should nonetheless proceed. 147 The court held that the second 
step of Zapata "is intended to thwart instances where corporate 
actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to 
satisfy its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply prematurely 
terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration 
in the corporation '.s interest." 148 The court also held, however, that 
courts should use this step to give "special consideration to matters of 
law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best inter-
mined that the shareholder was not required to make a demand on the corporation 
prior to filing suit. I focus on this standard because it is my experience that share-
holders rarely make a demand and therefore the more deferential standard applica-
ble in cases where shareholders do make a demand rarely comes into play. Instead, at 
least in my own experience, shareholders almost always allege that demand is futile, 
knowing that their suit will be dismissed if they are wrong, but that they will get the 
benefit of the Zapata standard if they can persuade the court on this crucial point. 
144 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 33-724(a) (2005 & Supp. 2008) ("A derivative pro-
ceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if [the SLC] has 
determined in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its con-
clusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the 
best interests of the corporation."); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 156D, § 7.44 (LexisNexis 
2005) ("A derivative proceeding commenced after rejection of a demand shall be 
dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if the court finds that either: ( 1) 
[the SLC] has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon 
which its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is 
not in the best interests of the corporation; or (2) shareholders specified in subsec-
tion (b) (3) have determined that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not 
in the best interests of the corporation."). 
145 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
146 See id. at 788-89. 
147 Id. at 789. 
148 Id. (emphasis added); see a/,so Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1164 n.40 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (holding that the second step of Zapata is intended "to provide a safeguard 
against the danger that the difficult-to-detect influence of fellow-feeling among direc-
tors (i.e., so-called 'stmctural bias') does not cause cessation of meritorious litigation 
valuable to the company)," aff d sub nom. In re HealthSouth Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 
19896, 2004 WL 835879 (Del. Apr. 14, 2004). 
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ests."149 This language reflects the unique quasi-public attributes of 
derivative suits described above. In short, the second step of Zapata is 
the legal hook that allows courts to resurrect the public model of 
derivative suits. As we shall see, courts have used this hook, albeit 
largely implicitly, in a number of cases where SLCs have requested 
that courts stay or dismiss a derivative suit that was not in the best 
interests of the plaintiff corporation. 
2. Stays of Derivative Suits 
SLCs have two choices when they are asked to opine on a deriva-
tive suit that threatens the plaintiff corporation's defense of a parallel 
securities class action. They can ask the court to stay the derivative 
suit until the securities class action has been resolved, or they can ask 
the court to dismiss the derivative suit altogether. 150 In many cases, a 
stay will achieve the best of both worlds. It will prevent a derivative 
suit from negatively impacting a securities class action, while still 
allowing the plaintiff corporation to pursue the derivative claims if it 
chooses following resolution of the securities class action. 
Many courts, however, have rejected requests by SLCs to stay 
derivative suits under these circumstances, proceeding on the assump-
tion that justice delayed for the derivative plaintiff is justice denied.151 
The famous Tyco152 case demonstrates this point. At the time of the 
court's 2003 decision, Tyco International, Ltd. (Tyco) was in the mid-
dle of one of the most well-known corporate scandals in recent his-
tory. The company's executives had been accused of looting the 
company of hundreds of millions of dollars, including (infamously) 
more than $1 million for a party for the CEO's ex-wife and $6000 for a 
shower curtain. 153 Following the announcement of significant 
accounting irregularities, Tyco's stock price fell precipitously, from a 
149 Zapata Carp., 430 A.2d at 789. 
150 See, e.g., Abbey v. Computer & Commc'ns Tech. Corp., 457 A.2d 368, 369 (Del. 
Ch. 2003). 
151 It is common for courts to stay derivative suits during an SLC investigation. 
Such a stay, however, ends when the SLC issues its recommendation, which is often 
long before the end of a related securities class action. See, e.g., id. at 375 (holding 
that a derivative suit should only be stayed for a "reasonable time" to permit an SLC to 
complete its investigation). 
152 In re Tyco Int'!, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., No. 02-1335-B, 2003 WL 23830479 
(D.N.H. Jan. 29, 2003). 
153 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyco's Ex-Chief Going to Court in 'Greed Case, 'N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 29, 2003, at Al. Tyco's CEO L. Dennis Kozlowski was later sentenced to 8 1/3 to 
25 years in prison for his role in the scandal. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Tyco Officers 
Get 8 to 25 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at Al. 
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high of $45.4375 per share on September 1, 2000 to a low of $7.41 per 
share on September 27, 2001. 154 Tyco was hit with a wave of share-
holder suits, including forty securities class actions, eight ERISA suits, 
and numerous derivative suits.155 These suits were all based largely on 
the same underlying allegations of accounting fraud and corporate 
waste. 
In 2002, Tyco asked the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Hampshire, which was overseeing the consolidated lawsuits, to stay 
discovery in the derivative and ERISA suits until the court ruled on 
the company's motion to dismiss the securities class action. 156 The 
company argued that a stay was necessary because discovery in the 
derivative suits would allow the securities plaintiffs to circumvent the 
Reform Act's mandatory stay of discovery in the securities class 
action. 157 Tyco also asked the court to bar the securities plaintiffs 
from obtaining access to documents produced in the ERISA and 
derivative suits. 158 
The court denied both requests. The court recognized that 
allowing the derivative suit to move forward might hurt Tyco's defense 
of the securities class actions but expressly declined to elevate the pri-
vate compensatory goals of the derivative suit over the public goals. 159 
The court acknowledged, for example, that the plaintiffs in the securi-
ties class action might be able to use discovery material from the deriv-
ative and ERISA suits to bolster their claims, stating "if plaintiffs in the 
ERISA and Derivative Actions uncover new evidence of wrongdoing by 
the defendants, they are likely to amend their complaints and thereby 
provide the plaintiffs in the Securities Actions with information that 
may be useful in drafting their own amended complaint."160 The 
court held, however, that "any interest that the defendants have in 
delaying discovery does not override the legitimate interest that the 
plaintiffs in the ERISA and Derivative Actions have in obtaining an 
expeditious resolution of their claims."161 
The court also permitted the securities plaintiffs to obtain imme-
diate access to the discovery material in the case, despite the stay of 
154 See Consolidated Securities Class Action Complaint 11 243, In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. 
Multidistrict Litig., No. 02-1335-B, 2008 WL 489257 (D.N.H. Feb. 20, 2008), 2004 WL 
3770745. 
155 See Tyco Int'I, Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22-30 (Dec. 11, 2006). 
156 In re Tyco, 2003 WL 23830479, at *3. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. at *4. 
159 See id. at *3. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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discovery under the Reform Act. The court noted that the securities 
claims were not frivolous and "keeping all parties on an equal footing 
with respect to discovery serves important case management interests 
in this complex litigation."162 Thus, the court in Tyco acted consist-
ently with the public model of derivative suits, basing its decision 
more on the legal merits of the suit and concerns about judicial effi-
ciency than on whether the suit would benefit Tyco.163 
Other courts have been more receptive to requests to stay deriva-
tive suits under these circumstances, largely because they have focused 
on the central importance of corporate self-interest in assessing the 
merits of the suit. In Breault v. Folino, 164 for example, the derivative 
plaintiff alleged that several of the corporation's officers and directors 
had engaged in a host of corporate misdeeds, including insider trad-
ing and lying to the public.165 These claims were nearly identical to 
claims in a parallel securities class action.166 The plaintiff corporation 
asked the court to stay the derivative suit during the pendency of the 
securities class action, arguing that simultaneous prosecution of the 
two suits could harm the corporation's defense of the securities class 
action. 167 
Unlike Tyco, the court in Breault agreed to stay the derivative suit. 
The court noted that a derivative suit "may proceed only when it is in 
the company's best interest."168 The court held that prosecution of 
the derivative suit could interfere with the corporation's defense of 
the securities class action because the individual defendants in the 
derivative suit would likely be witnesses in the securities class action 
and the shareholder plaintiff could only prevail by undermining their 
credibility. 169 The court also noted that prosecution of both actions 
would divert the corporation's financial and management resources 
162 Id. at *4; see also In re FirstEnergy S'holder Derivative Litig., 219 F.R.D. 584, 587 
(N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that the court was "utterly unconvinced that it should 
enter a protective order [in a derivative suit] based on [the] speculative harm" that 
the plaintiff in a parallel securities action could use information it obtained against 
the corporation in that action). 
163 Tyco eventually settled the consolidated securities class action for $2.975 bil-
lion, one of the largest settlements in history in a securities class action. See Press 
Release, Tyco Int'!, Ltd., Tyco Enters into Agreement to Resolve Legacy Securities 
Class Action Litigation (May 15, 2007), available at http:/ /investors.tyco.com/phoe-
nix.zh unl?c= l l 2348&p=irolnewsArticle&ID= 1000469&highlight=. 
164 No. SACV010826GLTANX, 2002 WL 31974381 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2002). 
165 See id. at *l. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 Id. 
169 See id. at *2. 
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away from the securities class action. 170 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that it was not in the corporation's best interest to prosecute 
the derivative suit at the same time that the corporation was defend-
ing against the securities class action. 171 
Taken together, Tyco and Breault illustrate the uncertain legal 
landscape that SLCs face in their efforts to protect the corporate inter-
est. The challenges for SLCs do not end here because, even where 
available, a stay is far from a perfect solution. First, it is often impossi-
ble to stay a derivative suit until all threats to the corporation have 
passed. In many cases, the corporation may not be named in a securi-
ties class action at the time that the corporation is trying to decide 
whether to proceed with a derivative suit, but the corporation may 
fear that a shareholder will file a securities class action at a later date. 
The corporation may be especially concerned that a securities class 
action will follow a victory in the derivative suit. It is unlikely that the 
court will stay the derivative suit for several years until the statute of 
limitations on a securities class action has expired. 
Second, even if a corporation resolves a securities class action, it 
may fear subsequent government investigations. The federal securi-
ties laws empower the SEC to file civil enforcement acts against those 
who mislead market investors. 172 The SEC has five years to file a suit 
for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, 173 but 
there is no similar restriction on remedial actions brought by the SEC, 
such as actions for injunctions or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 174 
As a result, even the passage of time cannot protect a corporation 
from all of the risks of parallel litigation. 
Finally, the passage of time can negatively impact the corpora-
tion's likelihood of success in a derivative suit. If the corporation waits 
until a parallel securities class action has ended to file a derivative suit, 
it may find that the statute of limitations on the derivative suit has 
170 See id. 
171 See id.; see also In re E.F. Hutton Banking Practices Litig., 634 F. Supp. 265, 270 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that "a disinterested board" faced with parallel derivative suits 
and securities class actions "might well ... conclude it to be unwise to subject [the 
corporation] to further litigation [in the derivative suit] clearly calculated to under-
cut [the individual defendants'] veracity and general effectiveness as witnesses"); 
Brudno v. Wise, No. Civ. A. 19953, 2003 WL 1874750, at *l (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 2003) 
(staying a derivative suit that was in reality a placeholder indemnity action "for any 
injury suffered by [the corporation] as a result of the Federal Securities Action"). 
172 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(3) (A) (2006). 
173 28 u.s.c. § 2462 (2006). 
174 See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991F.2d1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Williams, 884 
F. Supp. 28, 30-31 (D. Mass. 1995). 
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expired175 or that the relevant evidence has withered over time (as 
memories have a tendency to do) or disappeared entirely. These con-
cerns often lead SLCs to recommend that courts dismiss derivative 
suits entirely. 
3. Dismissals of Derivative Suits 
SLCs face even more skepticism from the courts when they rec-
ommend dismissal of derivative suits. Many courts are reluctant to 
dismiss these suits because they think that dismissals will allow alleged 
wrongdoers off the hook. As with the stay decisions, however, courts 
have not spoken with one voice. A few courts have sided with the 
corporation, granting SLC requests to dismiss derivative suits that con-
flict with parallel securities class actions. The two cases discussed 
below illustrate both sides of the debate. 
The first case is the Second Circuit's decision in jay v. North. 176 
The plaintiff in joy alleged that the defendant officers and directors 
breached their fiduciary duty to Citytrust Bancorp, Inc. (Citytrust) by 
issuing multimillion dollar loans to a financially precarious real estate 
developer who ultimately defaulted on the loans.177 Citytrust 
appointed an SLC to review the allegations and the SLC concluded 
that the suit against certain of the defendants should be terminated 
because there was no reasonable possibility of success against these 
defendants.178 The district court granted the corporation's motion to 
dismiss and the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case back 
to the district court.179 
In justifying its decision, the Second Circuit placed strict limita-
tions on the type of costs that a district court (or an SLC) can consider 
in reviewing an SLC recommendation.180 The court held that a dis-
trict court can consider the direct costs and benefits of the derivative 
suit, including attorneys' fees, other litigation costs, and expenses 
related to mandatory indemnification.181 In most cases, according to 
the Second Circuit, these are the only relevant factors. Where, how-
ever, "the court finds a likely net return to the corporation which is 
175 See, e.g., Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 270-71 (Del. Ch. 1993) (not-
ing that the statute of limitations in derivative actions is three years unless a continu-
ing wrong extends the applicable limitations period). 
176 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). 
177 See id. at 884. 
178 See id. The SLC also recommended that the company attempt to settle the 
claims against other defendants. Id. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. at 892. 
181 See id. 
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not substantial in relation to shareholder equity, it may take into 
account two other items as costs."182 First, "it may consider the impact 
of distraction of key personnel by continued litigation."183 Second, "it 
may take into account potential lost profits which may result from the 
publicity of a trial."184 
The court did not directly address whether a district court can 
consider the effect of a derivative suit on other litigation pending 
against the corporation, such as a securities class action. The court's 
analysis, however, appears to rule out such consideration. The court 
acknowledged that the corporation might incur "other less direct 
costs" and that "such factors, with the two exceptions noted, should 
not be taken into account."185 It justified its holding by noting that 
" [ q] uite apart from the elusiveness of attempting to predict such 
effects, they are quite likely to be directly related to the degree of 
wrongdoing, a spectacular fraud being generally more newsworthy 
and damaging to morale than a mistake in judgment as to the 
strength of consumer demand." 186 
This same analysis would apply to consideration of the impact of 
a derivative suit on other litigation. As discussed briefly above, the risk 
that a corporation will face substantial liability in a securities class 
action if an SLC recommends going forward with a derivative suit is 
related in large part to the degree of wrongdoing by corporate offi-
cials. The conflict between a derivative suit and a securities class 
action is most often apparent in the most egregious cases of corporate 
wrongdoing, 187 and thus it is in these cases that SLCs will be most 
concerned about liability in resulting securities class actions. Accord-
ingly, one could fairly read joy as prohibiting a corporation or a court 
from considering the impact of a derivative suit on a parallel securities 
class action. Other courts have agreed with the holding in joy. 188 
Like the Tyco decision, these cases are based largely on the public 
model of derivative suits. These courts want SLCs to concern them-
selves largely with the legal merits of derivative suits, not with the busi-
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
188 See, e.g., In re Par Pharm., Inc. Derivative Litig., 750 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (holding expressly that an SLC cannot consider the impact of a derivative suit 
on other pending litigation because "(t]he issue ... is whether [the derivative] claims 
are viable in this derivative action not whether they conflict with the position taken in 
another litigation"). 
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ness impact of the suits. If a case involved a clear violation of the law 
(and defendants with large pockets), joy and other similar cases would 
likely allow the suit to continue, even if the suit had substantial indi-
rect costs and thus was not in the corporation's best interests. 
The Eastern District of Michigan's decision in In re Consumer Pow-
ers Co. Derivative Litigation189 represents the opposite end of the spec-
trum. The SLC in Consumer Powers rejected a shareholder's demand 
that the corporation commence litigation against certain of the corpo-
ration's directors and officers. 190 In conducting its investigation, the 
SLC interviewed the company's counsel regarding the impact of the 
suit on several pending proceedings, including a securities class 
action, an SEC investigation, and a rate case before the Michigan Pub-
lic Service Commission. 191 The company's counsel told the SLC that 
"if Consumers filed a complaint against its directors for wrongdoing, 
this complaint would be deemed to be an admission in the [securi-
ties] case of the very claims Consumers had denied in that case."192 
The potential recoverable damages in the derivative suit were approxi-
mately $50 million, while the corporation stood to lose billions of dol-
lars in the other related proceedings.193 Based on this analysis, the 
SLC concluded that it was not in the corporation's best interests to 
pursue a claim against the corporation's officers and directors. The 
shareholder then filed a derivative suit, arguing that the SLC's deci-
sion not to bring the suit was based on the SLC's improper considera-
tion of the impact of the derivative suit on the other suits. 194 
The court dismissed the shareholder's challenge, holding that 
the SLC's decision was reasonable in light of the risk that the deriva-
tive suit posed to the other proceedings. The court stated, "[£]or 
some, such as plaintiffs' counsel, forgoing $50,000,000 to pursue a 
'doomed litigation' posture is folly." 195 "For others," the court 
explained: 
[P]ursuing $50,000,000 in the derivative claim at the risk of enhanc-
ing the likelihood of loss in Consumers' other litigation and corpo-
rate endeavors would be equivalent to the directors of the White 
Star Lines on April 14, 1912, ordering a midnight auction of the 
Titanic deck chairs instead of trying to save the ship. 196 
189 132 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
190 See id. at 458. 
191 See id. at 478-79. 
192 Id. at 478. 
193 See id. at 486. 
194 See id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
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The court concluded that: 
[I]t is not for this Court to decide who is right, nor to second-guess 
the special Advisory Committee, but only to consider whether the 
plaintiffs have evidence that would support a determination that the 
decision-making procedures were so uninformed and curtailed as to 
lie beyond the parameters of behavior that would be acceptable to 
reasonable business people. 197 
The court accordingly dismissed the suit. And just as some courts 
have followed the joy decision at one extreme of this issue, other 
courts have adopted the opposite result in Consumer Powers. 198 
These decisions reflect the private model of derivative suits. The 
court based its decision on the best interests of the plaintiff corpora-
tion, not on a desire to punish the alleged wrongdoers or deter similar 
misconduct in the future. Given this focus, the court left the fate of 
the litigation in the hands of the SLC because the determination of a 
corporation's best interests is a business issue best left to corporate 
directors. 
In the end, this split in the case law leaves SLCs in a difficult 
position. On the one hand, an SLC will not want to recommend pur-
suing a derivative suit if the suit may hurt a corporation's position in 
other pending litigation. On the other hand, an SLC does not want to 
issue a recommendation that rests on legally impermissible grounds. 
SLCs are well aware that their recommendations may face intense 
scrutiny, both from within the corporation and from shareholders, 
regulators, and the public,199 and they do not want to risk issuing a 
recommendation that will not withstand judicial scrutiny. Resolution 
of this issue will significantly benefit the SLC process by letting SLCs 
know the permissible scope of their review. It will also benefit the 
other stakeholders in derivative suits-shareholders, corporations, 
and society generally-by carving out a unique role for derivative suits 
within the larger framework of shareholder litigation. 
197 Id. 
198 For example, in Weiland v. Illinois Power Co., No. 89-1088, 1990 WL 267364 
(C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1990), a corporation moved to dismiss a derivative suit on the basis 
of an SLC report. The plaintiff argued that the SLC could not have been indepen-
dent or acted in good faith because the SLC would have exposed the corporation to 
liability in an investigation by the Illinois Commerce Commission if it had recom-
mended going forward with the derivative suit. Id. at *10. Applying Zapata, the court 
rejected this argument. The court stated that "the future impact a derivative action 
will have on a corporation is a relevant consideration in addition to the consideration 
of the likelihood of the success of the claims." Id. at *15. 
199 See Davis, supra note 119, at 1326 ("From the outset, the SLC conducts its pro-
cess with the awareness that its recommendation, if favorable to the director-defend-
ants, will almost certainly be challenged and scrutinized."). 
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III. TOWARD A BROADER VIEW OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
We have now seen that shareholder litigation rests on an often-
flawed theoretical foundation. These flaws result from the fact that 
courts and scholars alike have failed to consider the way in which vari-
ous types of shareholder litigation can work together to achieve the 
goals of shareholder litigation. In this Part, I argue that we need to 
reconceptualize shareholder litigation, bringing theory and practice 
together to solve the conflict between securities class actions and 
derivative suits. I then discuss the impact of this proposed solution on 
the compensatory and deterrent goals of shareholder litigation. 
A. Proposed Solution 
How should courts resolve the conflict between derivative suits 
and securities class actions? Should they follow the private model of 
derivative suits and grant SLC requests to stay or dismiss derivative 
suits that conflict with parallel securities class actions? Or should they 
hold true to the public model of derivative suits and permit share-
holders to proceed with these suits even if they are not in the best 
interests of the corporations in whose names these suits are brought? 
The answer lies in remembering why derivative suits exist in the 
first place. As discussed above in Part I, derivative suits were created 
because of a conflict of interest between corporations and their 
officers and directors. 200 Although state law normally empowers 
officers and directors to control corporate legal strategy,201 this 
approach does not work where the officers or directors themselves 
stand accused of misconduct. Derivative suits are designed to avoid 
this conflict of interest by permitting shareholders to sue on the cor-
poration's behalf.202 Thus, derivative suits are a solution to a limited 
problem, not an effort to reshape the remedies against alleged wrong-
doers. Put another way, despite their unique form, derivative suits are 
still private lawsuits brought on behalf of private litigants. As in any 
civil lawsuit, the court should not force these suits to continue if they 
200 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
201 Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 529 A.2d 254, 259 (Del. Ch. 1987) 
(stating that it is a "basic principle of corporate governance that decisions on behalf 
of a corporation (including a decision whether to commence litigation) are normally 
made by the corporation's board of directors"), affd in part, rev'd in part by 540 A.2d 
726 (Del. 1988). 
202 See Aronson v. Lewis, 4 73 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The machinery of corpo-
rate democracy and the derivative suit are potent tools to redress the conduct of a 
torpid or unfaithful .management. The derivative action developed in equity to 
enable shareholders to sue in the corporation's name where those in control of the 
company refused to assert a claim belonging to it."). 
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are not in the best interests of the parties on whose behalf the suits are 
brought.203 
This analysis leads to a simple solution to the conflict between 
derivative suits and securities class actions. In deciding whether a 
derivative suit should proceed, an SLC acting in good faith should be 
permitted to consider all of the costs and benefits of the suit for the 
plaintiff corporation, including the impact of the derivative suit on a 
parallel securities class action. If the SLC believes that such costs 
exceed the suit's benefits, it should ask the court to stay or dismiss the 
suit. The reviewing court should then examine whether the SLC was 
independent and conducted an adequate investigation. Depending 
on the requirements of state law, the court may also consider the rea-
sonableness of the SLC's analysis.2°4 The court may not, however, 
reject the SLC's request on the ground that the SLC was not entitled 
to consider the indirect costs of the derivative suit, including the 
potential impact of the suit on a related securities class action. 
This analysis mirrors the analysis that a corporation's general 
counsel would perform prior to deciding whether the corporation 
should initiate a lawsuit. A general counsel would not file suit without 
considering all of the costs and benefits of the suit. Likewise, an SLC 
should be able to consider all of the costs and benefits before decid-
ing whether to recommend that a derivative suit proceed. It should 
not matter whether the suit's costs come in the form of legal bills from 
Skadden Arps or additional legal risk in a securities class action. 2o5 
The same analysis should apply when SLCs are faced with other 
types of parallel litigation filed against the corporation, such as ERISA 
lawsuits or government enforcement actions. A recent study found 
that over twenty percent of all securities class actions filed since 1995 
have been accompanied by a corresponding SEC action. 206 There are 
not figures showing the percentage of derivative suits that are accom-
panied by SEC actions, but that figure is likely to be significant. An 
203 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 6, at 434 (asking whether the shareholders of the 
corporation named in a derivative suit should be asked to subsidize society's deterrent 
efforts). 
204 This step would apply in jurisdictions that follow the Delaware Supreme 
Court's decision in Zapata C01p. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981). See 
supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing Zapata's "second step"). 
205 This calculation should include the corporation's desire for specific deter-
rence, or deterrence of the plaintiff corporation's own officers and directors. Corpo-
rations that take a hard stand against wrongdoing by their executives are less likely to 
be victims of similar wrongdoing in the future. Corporations that have had to pay 
significant damages as a result of their executives' conduct may want to take such a 
hard stand to avoid a repeat of such situations in the future. 
206 SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 43, at 12. 
2008] CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 119 
SLC should be able to take into account the impact of a derivative suit 
on a parallel ERJSA suit or SEC enforcement action just as it should 
be able to take into account the impact of the derivative suit on a 
parallel securities class action. 
This proposal will fit into the existing legal framework with only a 
few necessary tweaks. For the most part, courts can simply fold this 
proposal into their review of SLC recommendations. The most signifi-
cant change concerns the concluding statements of the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Zapata, a decision that has shaped judicial review of 
derivative suits across the country.207 In Zapata the court established a 
two-step process of review.208 The court must first determine whether 
the SLC was independent, acted in good faith, and had a reasonable 
basis for its decision. 209 If these threshold standards are met, the 
court should then exercise its own "independent business judgment" 
to determine whether the suit should be dismissed.210 At the end of 
its opinion, the court held that a reviewing court could use this sec-
ond step to "give special consideration to matters of law and public 
policy in addition to the corporation's best interests."211 Although 
courts have not cited expressly to this step of Zapata, the sentiment 
behind it has informed cases addressing the conflict between securi-
ties class actions and derivative suits, as we saw above. 
My proposal requires abandoning this part of Zapata, as well as 
the underlying sentiment that it represents. The Delaware Supreme 
Court should make clear that the second step of the Zapata test is 
designed to ensure that the SLC is actually acting in the corporation's 
best interests, not to bring additional considerations into the mix.212 
207 As just one example, a Westlaw search reveals that the decision has been cited 
over fifteen hundred times over the last seventeen years. 
208 See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. 
209 See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 788-89. 
210 Id. at 789. At least one judge has been skeptical of this standard, stating that 
the second step of Zapata requires him to determine in his "oxymoronic judicial 'busi-
ness judgment,' [whether the suit] is in the best interests of the [corporation]." In re 
Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 928 (Del. Ch. 2003); see alw Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 39 
( 1991) (" [T] he idea that a trial court can exercise 'business judgment' is anomalous. 
Trial judges are not businesspeople; they do not possess the practical experience and 
exposure to the special needs of the corporation that characterizes the business judg-
ment of corporate managers."). 
211 Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 789. 
212 I am not the first commentator to find fault with this step of the Zapata test. 
See James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Cri-
tique a/Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DuKE LJ. 959, 988-89 ("Although the court in 
'Zapata apparently approved [of courts taking into account the public interest in 
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This interpretation of the test will not undercut 'Zapata; to the con-
trary, it will give real teeth to judicial review of SLC recommendations. 
Many commentators have argued that SLCs suffer from a structural 
bias that predisposes them to recommend against pursuing a deriva-
tive suit.213 By using the second step of Zapata as a judicial check on 
whether SLCs are acting in the best interests of plaintiff corporations, 
courts can ensure that SLCs base their decisions on the best interests 
of corporations, rather than a "there but for the grace of God go 1"214 
empathy for defendants. 
This judicial check may come into play in assessing an SLC's rec-
ommendation to dismiss a derivative suit as opposed to staying the 
suit. On this issue, I would advocate deference, tempered by mean-
ingful judicial review, to SLCs. As explained in Part II, there are often 
legitimate reasons why a corporation would prefer outright dismissal 
over a stay.215 The corporation may want to minimize the public rela-
tions fallout from the alleged wrongdoing, or it may fear subsequent 
lawsuits, including SEC enforcement actions, that might follow a 
securities class action. Weighing the respective costs and benefits of a 
stay versus a dismissal requires a complicated assessment of business 
and legal objectives. An SLC is particularly well-suited to conduct this 
assessment in the first instance given its insider knowledge of the cor-
poration. Yet this is also an area in which SLCs may reveal their biases 
against derivative suits, recommending dismissal without giving seri-
ous consideration to less drastic alternatives. Accordingly, a court 
applying the second step of Zapata should give special attention to this 
issue, looking skeptically upon an SLC's recommendation to dismiss a 
derivative suit when a stay would suffice.216 The level of skepticism 
will vary depending on the intricacies of state law, but regardless of 
deciding whether to dismiss a derivative suit, this position] conflicts with accepted 
views of the purpose of derivative suits and would pose insurmountable problems." 
(footnote omitted)). 
213 See, e.g., 2 AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE§ 7.10 cmt. d 
(1994) ("Commentators have emphasized that a consistent pattern has surrounded 
the use of the special litigation committee: once such a committee is formed to review 
the merits of the litigation, the outcome of the process is generally a foregone conclu-
sion-namely, dismissal of the action is recommended against all defendants."). 
214 Zapata Cmp., 430 A.2d at 787. 
215 See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text. 
216 In jurisdictions with less extensive judicial review of SLC recommendations, an 
SLC may be entitled to greater deference in deciding between a stay and outright 
dismissal. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-672.4 (2006) (requiring a court to dismiss a 
derivative proceeding if an SLC, after a good faith review and evaluation, has deter-
mined that a derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation). 
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these differences, courts should remam a check on SLC 
decisionmaking. 
The same judicial oversight should come into play when an SLC 
recommends staying or dismissing a derivative suit out of fear that 
decisions in the derivative suit could harm the corporation in other 
lawsuits that have yet to be filed. Although derivative suits often fol-
low on the heels of securities class actions, this order is not set in 
stone. An SLC may rationally fear that, even if shareholders have not 
yet filed a securities class action, one may follow a successful derivative 
suit. In this situation, the reviewing court should again look to the 
SLC to answer some probing questions: How likely is it that sharehold-
ers or the government will file related litigation in the future? Would 
the plaintiffs in these other lawsuits be able to use decisions or facts 
uncovered in the derivative suit to help build their case against the 
corporation? What are the likely damages in such lawsuits? An SLC 
may not be able to provide a definitive answer to these questions, but 
it should have thought about these questions and factored the likely 
range of possible outcomes into its recommendation. 
Before we turn to the benefits of and possible objections to this 
approach, a few final words about the proposal itself are in order. 
First, this proposal does not mean that the broader deterrent goals of 
derivative suits are irrelevant. Like all private suits, derivative suits 
send a message to other potential wrongdoers that they may be held 
accountable for their actions. To the extent that courts can stress the 
deterrent goals of these suits in a way that is consistent with the plain-
tiff corporation's interests, they should do so, a point discussed fur-
ther below. Where the plaintiff corporation's interests are 
inconsistent with such goals, however, courts should choose an 
approach that best protects the interests of corporations. 
Second, this proposal views corporations qua corporations. 
Shareholders may well have legitimate grievances against the officers 
or directors named as defendants in these suits, or even against the 
corporations themselves. These grievances, however, should be aired 
in securities class actions or other lawsuits in which the shareholders 
themselves are the parties in interest. Shareholders should not be 
permitted to exercise their representative power in derivative suits to 
vindicate their own individual interests, especially where these inter-
ests are contrary to the interests of the corporations on whose behalf 
these suits are brought. 
Finally, this proposal reflects a belief that courts should not use 
derivative suits to solve perceived problems with securities class 
actions. The federal securities laws impose steep procedural hurdles 
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on securities plaintiffs.217 A prime example is the Reform Act's prohi-
bition on discovery prior to a decision on a motion to dismiss. As 
described above in Part I, plaintiffs' attorneys often use derivative suits 
to circumvent the Reform Act's stay of discovery by obtaining discov-
ery material in derivative suits that they can then use to bolster their 
complaints in parallel securities class actions.218 This loophole will 
disappear if corporations are permitted to stay or dismiss derivative 
suits that threaten their defense of securities class actions. As a result, 
there is a risk that courts will dismiss a greater number of meritorious 
securities class actions simply because the securities plaintiffs could 
not obtain the necessary discovery to support their claims. This risk is 
real, but it should not be addressed by using derivative suits as an 
unofficial back door around the restrictions in the Reform Act. 
In the end, the approach outlined in this Article reflects a 
broader view of shareholder litigation. Under this view, securities 
class actions and derivative suits should work together to achieve the 
diverse goals of shareholder litigation. To understand this point, we 
now tum to the benefits of and possible objections to this approach, a 
discussion that will bring us full circle back to the public and private 
models of derivative suits introduced in Part II. 
B. Benefits of the Proposal 
An obvious benefit of this approach is its impact on the private 
model of derivative suits. This approach furthers the private model-
and the compensatory goals that this model represents-by ensuring 
that corporations have a legal mechanism to stay or dismiss derivative 
suits that are not in their best interests. As a result, under this 
approach, derivative suits will be far more likely to benefit the corpo-
rations on whose behalf they are brought. 
The approach outlined in this Article also promotes compensa-
tory goals more subtly by enhancing the SLC process. This process is 
the best way to ensure that derivative suits represent the interests of 
plaintiff corporations. Every state has agreed with this assessment, 
with all fifty states adopting some version of the SLC process.219 Given 
217 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
219 The Annotated Model Act statutory comparison provides, "[Alli 52 jurisdic-
tions provide for committees to be appointed by the board of directors. The District 
of Columbia and South Dakota statutes only refer specifically to an executive commit-
tee. The other jurisdictions follow the Model Act in expressly allowing for the crea-
tion of other committees." 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. § 8:25, at 8-146 (Supp. 
2002). 
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this common ground, it makes no sense to place constraints on SLCs 
that erode the value that SLCs bring to derivative suits. 
My proposal lifts these restraints, enhancing the SLC process in 
three important and related ways. First, it permits SLCs to take into 
account the very factors they are best equipped to consider. These 
factors include considerations related to the corporation's business, 
such as the distraction of key personnel, the risk of negative publicity, 
and the impact of the derivative suit on other parallel litigation. If an 
SLC is prohibited from considering these factors and is only permit-
ted to consider the legal merits of the suit, there is no real reason for 
SLC involvement.220 SLC members are appointed for their business 
skill, not their legal acumen, and if the permissible considerations are 
primarily legal, their input will not add significant value to the suit. 
Given that states have universally endorsed the SLC process, the law 
should allow the SLC process to work in the intended manner. 
Second, the approach in this Article will enhance the SLC pro-
cess by ensuring that SLC members are truly independent. State law 
deems directors independent if they base their decisions on "'the cor-
porate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous 
considerations or influences.' "221 This independence requirement 
would be turned on its head if SLC members were prohibited from 
considering the impact of a derivative suit on a parallel securities class 
action, a consideration that goes directly to the "corporate merits" of 
the derivative suit.222 Given the increasing importance of indepen-
dence in corporate law today, 223 it would make no sense to adopt a 
legal framework for shareholder litigation that rejects this key notion. 
220 Cf Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 125, at 324 (arguing that SLCs should be 
required to "advance a substantial business judgment independent of the merits of 
the litigation" to justify dismissal of a derivative suits because "courts and not litigants 
should decide the merits of the litigation"). 
221 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003) (quoting 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984)); see also Strougo v. Padegs, 27 F. 
Supp. 2d 442, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to accept plaintiff's argument that an 
SLC member was not independent because, inter alia, he allegedly considered the 
interests of the public at large, in addition to the corporation's interests, in deciding 
whether to recommend that a derivative suit be allowed to proceed). 
222 See, e.g., supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of 
derivative actions to recoup the losses from security actions). 
223 See, e.g., Seth W. Ashby, Strengthening the Public Company Board of Directors: Lim-
ited Shareholder Access to the Corporate BaUot vs. Required Majority Board Independence, 2005 
U. ILL. L. REv. 521, 540-45; William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Nw 
Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two 
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 967 (2003) (explaining the 
increased push for director independence in the wake of Enron); Charles M. Elson & 
Christopher]. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FoR-
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Third, the approach in this Article enhances compensatory goals 
by adding legitimacy to the SLC process. SLCs are already under fire 
by critics who claim that they lack the capacity to perform an indepen-
dent review of derivative suits.224 It will only add fuel to the fire to 
prohibit SLCs from issuing reports that take into account the impact 
of derivative suits on other pending litigation. Such a limitation 
would be a difficult calculus for SLCs to adopt. Indeed, it is likely that 
many SLCs will refuse to serve in this role. Instead, in cases where a 
narrow calculus (such as the one advocated by the court in joy) tilts in 
favor of the suit, but a more exhaustive review of the suit's costs and 
benefits reveals that the suit is not in the plaintiff corporation's best 
interests, an SLC will likely choose from one of two alternatives. First, 
an SLC may simply refuse to make a recommendation. This option is 
unsatisfying, as it prevents corporations from having their voices 
heard in suits brought on their behalf. It also creates a risk that par-
ties in other related litigation will deem the SLC's silence as a "practi-
cal 'admission'" of the allegations in the derivative suit and will 
attempt to use the SLC's silence against the corporation in those 
other cases. 225 The Supreme Court of Delaware has recognized this 
risk, holding that an SLC that attempts to remain neutral regarding 
the merits of a derivative suit may be deemed to have given "tacit 
approval for the continuation of the litigation."226 
Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, an SLC may only pretend 
to follow joy. They may continue to consider the full spectrum of costs 
and benefits, but rest their recommendations only on those costs and 
benefits that courts have deemed acceptable. This may not even be a 
deliberate strategy. Weighing the costs and benefits of a derivative 
suit is not an exact science. An SLC armed with the knowledge that a 
derivative suit could threaten the corporation's defense of a related 
securities class action may weigh the other costs and benefits of the 
suit more harshly. This option is even more destructive to the SLC 
process than the option of silence. Considering that SLCs are already 
EST L. REv. 855, 856 (2003);Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management 
and Control of the Modem Business Cmporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 
1233, 1241 (2002). 
224 See, e.g., AM. LAw INST., supra note 213, § 7.10 cmt. d ("Commentators have 
emphasized that a consistent pattern has surrounded the use of the special litigation 
committee: once such a committee is formed to review the merits of the litigation, the 
outcome of the process is generally a foregone conclusion-namely, dismissal of the 
action is recommended against all defendants."). 
225 In re Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 132 F.R.D. 455, 487-88 (E.D. 
Mich. 1990). 
226 Kaplan v. Peat, Manvick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 731 (Del. 1988). 
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subject to criticism from those who doubt their ability to make inde-
pendent assessments of derivative suits, the SLC process will lose even 
more legitimacy if courts and commentators believe that SLCs are 
masking the true motivations behind their recommendations. 
In short, we should encourage courts to take a broader view of 
shareholder litigation in part because this perspective will go a long 
way toward enhancing the compensatory nature of these suits. Once 
we recognize that derivative suits are private suits brought on behalf of 
private litigants, we should take the next step of reshaping these suits 
to enhance their compensatory value. Moreover, as we will now see, 
taking this step does not mean that the other important goals of share-
holder litigation are forgotten. 
C. Potential Objections 
Critics may argue that the approach outlined in this Article pro-
tects compensatory goals, only to ignore the important deterrent goals 
that shareholder litigation is also supposed to serve. As explained in 
Part II, many courts and scholars have viewed the choice between the 
public and private models of derivative suits as a zero-sum game. They 
can either choose the private model and stay or dismiss derivative suits 
that conflict with parallel securities class actions, or they can choose 
the public model and permit these suits to continue. In the end, how-
ever, this either-or analysis misses the mark. There are persuasive rea-
sons to adopt the proposal set forth in this Article even if one supports 
the public model of derivative suits and the deterrent goals that it 
represents. 
It is undoubtedly true that fewer derivative suits will survive SLC 
review if SLCs are permitted to take into account the full costs and 
benefits of these suits.227 The derivative suits that remain, however, 
are more likely to have a real impact in deterring corporate wrongdo-
ing and thus are more likely to enhance the public model of derivative 
suits. Corporate litigation today resembles an Oklahoma land rush. 228 
A corporation's announcement of bad news all too often leads to a 
flurry of nearly identical litigation, including securities class actions, 
derivative suits, ERISA suits, and government investigations. In this 
227 I note here again, however, that an SLC (or a reviewing court) may determine 
that staying a parallel derivative suit is a more appropriate prophylactic than dis-
missing the case entirely. 
228 This apt analogy was developed by Professor John Coffee. See Coffee, supra 
note 120, at 228 (describing litigation as often "resembling the Oklahoma land rush, 
in which the filing of the public agency's action serves as the starting gun for a race 
between private attorneys, all seeking to claim the prize of lucrative class action settle-
ments, which public law enforcement has gratuitously presented them"). 
126 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 
environment, it is unlikely that derivative suits add much additional 
deterrence. 229 
This point underscores a flaw in the public model of derivative 
suits. This model is based on the idea that society needs derivative 
suits to deter corporate misconduct because individual wrongdoers 
will otherwise escape liability for their actions.230 It is not surprising 
that advocates of the public model would therefore frown upon a rule 
that permitted SLCs to recommend dismissal of derivative suits based 
on the impact of those suits on parallel securities class actions. It 
seems contrary to good governance principles to allow individual 
wrongdoers off the hook simply because their actions have created 
such problems for the corporation in other litigation that the corpora-
tion cannot risk going after them. 
This belief is understandable, but based on an overly narrow view 
of shareholder litigation. The conflict addressed in this Article only 
arises where a corporation faces multiple lawsuits arising out of the 
same conduct. In all likelihood, the alleged wrongdoers will also be 
named as defendants in these other lawsuits. It is extremely rare for a 
corporation to be the only defendant named in a securities class 
action; in almost all cases, the corporation is sued along with a num-
ber of its officers and directors.231 In addition, the SEC has stated 
that, where shareholders were the primary victims of the alleged 
wrongdoing, it will focus its enforcement efforts on the individual 
wrongdoers, rather than on corporations. 232 The SEC has also fre-
quently required individuals to waive their right to indemnification 
from their employers as a precondition to settling an SEC enforce-
229 Interestingly enough, for all of the scholarly focus on shareholder litigation, no 
one really argues that derivative suits are an effective weapon in the fight against cor-
porate misconduct. See, e.g., AM. LAw INST., supra note 213, at 5 (stating that the ALI 
"recognizes that the derivative action is neither the initial nor the primary protection 
for shareholders against managerial misconduct"). 
230 See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 125, at 307-08 (stating that under the private 
model of derivative suits, courts will be "placed in the morally compromising position 
of having ... to acknowledge that, despite the best efforts of the state, crime did 
indeed pay"). 
231 Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale reviewed all of the complaints in securities 
fraud class action suits filed in 1999 in the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, 
and Ninth Circuits. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 6, at 895. They found that all 
the complaints named the corporation as a defendant. Id. In only four of the eighty-
six complaints, however, was the corporation the only defendant. Id. The remaining 
eighty-two complaints named individual defendants as well. See id. 
232 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties Qan. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. 
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ment action, a requirement that forces these individuals to pay finan-
cial penalties out of their own pockets. 233 Accordingly, individual 
wrongdoers may escape liability to the corporation as a result of their 
actions, but it is unlikely that they will escape liability altogether. 234 
On the other hand, derivative suits can have a real deterrent 
effect in situations in which they are the only suits that are filed. The 
recent scandal concerning the backdating of stock options demon-
strates this point. In late 2005, news spread that many companies had 
backdated, or altered the dates on, grants of stock options to their 
executives. Although backdating is not illegal per se,235 it appears that 
many of the companies that engaged in this practice did not ade-
quately disclose the practice to their stockholders and did not follow 
the applicable tax mles.236 As a result, many companies had to restate 
their earnings. 237 Although this scandal captured the attention of the 
business press, it did not lead to a wave of securities class actions. As 
of September 2008, shareholders had filed only 39 securities class 
actions relating to the alleged backdating of stock options compared 
to 168 derivative suits.238 This example demonstrates that there are 
cases where the private model and the public model of derivative suits 
can coexist, allowing shareholders to pursue derivative suits without 
jeopardizing a corporation's position in other litigation.239 
233 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (2008) (stating that, in the SEC's view, corporate 
promises to indemnify officers and directors for violations of the Securities Act of 
1933 are "against public policy" and "therefore unenforceable"). 
234 As Professors Coffee and Schwartz have noted, "[T] he key question must be 
whether derivative litigation is likely substantially to further and enforce the policies 
of [federal law] in a manner superior to other means of enforcement." Coffee & 
Schwartz, supra note 125, at 298. Given the well-known weaknesses of the derivative 
suit, there is no reason to believe that the derivative suit will provide greater deter-
rence than these other suits. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 6, at 428 ("[I]n circumstances 
where securities class actions had also been filed ... it is questionable what [derivative 
suits] add by way of either compensation or deterrence."). 
235 See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of ~Executive Stock 
Options, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1597, 1601-02 (2007) ("[N]either backdating nor forward-
dating by itself is illegal, as long as it is duly authorized by the board, fully disclosed, 
and reported in keeping with tax rules."). 
236 See Frank Ahrens, Scandal Grows Over Backdating of Options, WASH. PosT, Oct. 
12, 2006, at DOI. 
237 See id. 
238 The D&O Diary, http:/ /www.dandodiary.com/ (July 20, 2006) (post entitled 
"Counting the Options Backdatings Lawsuits"), http:/ /www.dandodiary.com/2006/ 
07 I articles/options-backdating/ counting-the-options-backdating-lawsuits. 
239 For a detailed examination of the different types of derivative suits, including 
certain types of suits that shareholders cannot easily morph into securities class 
actions, see Davis, supra note 6, at 414-49. 
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Additionally, derivative suits are frequently the only suits that are 
filed in cases alleging more classic violations of the duty of loyalty by a 
single officer or director.240 Take, for example, a case alleging that a 
CEO embezzled money from his company or took kickbacks from cus-
tomers. It is unlikely that such allegations would spawn securities class 
actions, as the CEO's behavior likely did not impact the accuracy of 
the company's disclosures, at least in any material way, but the allega-
tions could easily lead to one or more derivative suits.241 
Finally, derivative suits may be the only type of suit filed in cases 
involving small and/or private companies.242 Securities class actions 
against such companies are "exceedingly rare," as they generally 
involve small damage claims and thus are not a worthy investment for 
those plaintiffs' attorneys accustomed to the large fees in securities 
class actions.243 As these examples illustrate, there are important 
areas where derivative suits do not simply mirror the allegations in 
parallel securities class actions.244 
240 Professors Thompson and Thomas's study of all of the derivative suits filed in 
the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1999 and 2000 found that shareholders alleged 
self-dealing by corporate managers in eighty-four percent of the suits involving pri-
vately held corporations and forty-nine percent of the suits involving public corpora-
tions. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 1766, 1772. 
241 See, e.g., Davis v. Anten, No. B118437, 2006 WL 848282 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 
2006) (ruling on a derivative suit filed against former officer alleging that he had 
embezzled funds from the corporation). 
242 Professors Thompson and Thomas's study also showed that of the twenty-five 
derivative suits filed against private companies in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 
1999 and 2000, only a single company was named in more than one suit. See Thomp-
son & Thomas, supra note 4, at 1765. They note, "By contrast, in derivative and class 
actions against public companies, the same transaction generated up to forty-one sep-
arate suits." Id. They conclude that: 
[Derivative] suits retain an important role in policing management in closely 
held corporations. Unlike public corporations, there is neither an estab-
lished market for a private company's stock nor similar constraints on man-
ager's misuse of the centralized power that is given to directors under 
Section 141 of the Delaware Code and Section 8.01 of the Model Business 
Corporation Act. Derivative suits can play an important role for protecting 
minority shareholder rights in the private company setting. 
Id. at 1760. As Dean Davis points out, however, shareholders may be able to file other 
types of suits in this context, including petitions for dissolution and direct suits for 
minority oppression. See Davis, supra note 6, at 423-27. 
243 See Choi, supra note 4, at 1466, 1499-502 ("For smaller firms, private class 
action litigation is exceedingly rare."). 
244 See, e.g., Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 1760 (arguing that although 
"the academy has virtually ignored derivative suits against private companies, ... in 
many states, such suits retain an important role in policing management" in these 
companies). 
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Derivative suits will have a greater deterrent impact if they are 
concentrated in areas like these where they do not duplicate allega-
tions in other lawsuits. As Professor James Cox has argued, the deter-
rent value of derivative suits is linked to the public image of these 
suits.245 Derivative suits are currently seen as largely frivolous suits, 
filed by plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to participate in the scramble of 
litigation against high-profile corporations and ending with little or 
no compensation paid to the corporation.246 Given this perception, it 
is not surprising that the defendants in derivative suits are often 
viewed as unfortunate victims of a flawed litigation system, rather than 
as actual wrongdoers, a perception that limits the deterrent impact of 
this litigation. 247 If directors believed that these suits had real teeth, 
the suits would have a greater chance of deterring corporate 
misconduct. 
The proposal in this Article will not lead to the demise of deriva-
tive suits. There are plenty of areas where derivative suits can serve 
the public interest without harming the corporations on whose behalf 
these suits are filed. The key is to focus the law's efforts on these suits, 
rather than assuming that every type of corporate lawsuit is appropri-
ate to remedy every allegation of corporate wrongdoing. 
CONCLUSION 
In the face of recent corporate scandals, courts have been under-
standably reluctant to forgo any opportunity to deter corporate mis-
conduct. It is precisely in this era of corporate scandals, however, that 
the limitations of shareholder litigation have become most apparent. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, securities class actions and 
derivative suits are not a zero-sum game for corporations. Nor is there 
evidence that parallel securities class actions and derivative suits deter 
corporate misconduct more effectively than more targeted litigation. 
Casting aside these erroneous assumptions, we must embrace a new 
conceptual framework that promotes all of the diverse goals of share-
holder litigation. Only then can we bring these new conceptual 
insights to bear on the current legal debate over how courts should 
handle parallel securities class actions and derivative suits. In short, 
245 Cox, supra note 4, at 5-9 (arguing, inter alia, that "the message of the individ-
ual derivative suit or securities class action is affected by the company it keeps with 
other shareholder suits"). 
246 See id. at 14-15. 
247 See id. at 8; see also Hawkins, supra note 49, at 602 (noting that "no shame is 
attached to being the victim of an unfair proceeding"). 
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more litigation is not necessarily better when it comes to combating 
corporate misconduct. 
As empirical evidence continues to mount regarding securities 
class actions and derivative suits, this broader view of shareholder liti-
gation raises additional questions. How can courts reshape the rules 
governing securities class actions and derivative suits to ensure that 
these suits are focused in the areas in which they have the greatest 
potential to benefit all of the constituencies of shareholder litigation? 
How can courts further refine the rules regarding other types of cor-
porate litigation to ensure that these lawsuits work together to achieve 
the diverse goals of our legal system? These questions remain for 
another day, but their very existence reflects a fundamental point: 
legal theory must catch up to legal practice in analyzing the tools used 
to combat corporate misconduct. Now is the perfect time to calm the 
perfect storm of shareholder litigation. 
